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A. Nature of the Problem
When a matter has been presented to a court by a federal agency
and an adverse decision handed down, many of these agencies as a mat-
ter of general policy will continue to adhere to the position that has
been rejected in the litigation. These agencies will present the same
position to other courts in an attempt to get a different decision and
gain vindication. This policy of relitigation extends to cases in which
the agencies lose in the federal courts of appeals.
It may be questioned whether a policy of relitigation (1) is con-
sistent with the law that has been built up over the past century in the
federal courts, (2) is consistent with general concepts of res judicata/
preclusion as they have developed and are developing at the present
time, and (3) is desirable as a matter of sound judicial administration
and is one that should be continued. The following sections will con-
sider the policy of relitigation in the light of these considerations and
attempt to come to some conclusions about relitigation and any feasible
alternative.
B. Relitigation as a General Policy of the Federal Government
At the present time the agencies of the federal government as a
.general policy engage in relitigation of issues that have been decided
in earlier litigation. The various federal agencies, apparently without
exception, engage in this time-consuming practice; some agencies,
however, persist more than others in relitigating matters that have al-
ready been subjected to judicial examination.
t Carver Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. A.B. 1943, De-
Pauw University; LL.B. 1949, Yale University.
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Perhaps more than any other agency, the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice in recent years has engaged in the practice of relitigation of issues
that the Service has lost initially. Some examples of the practice indi-
cate the attitude thatthe Service has adopted.
In a series of cases starting in 1969, the government litigated the
method of treating net operating loss carryback. The government lost
on this point in three different cases at the court of appeals level:
Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner,' Olympic Foundry Co. v.
United States2 and Foster Lumber Co. v. United States.' At the time
of Foster Lumber no court that had ever considered the issue had held
for the government. The IRS continued to litigate the issue, and sub-
sequent to Foster Lumber, two circuits held for the government.4 In
order to resolve a conflict among the circuits the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Foster Lumber and held for the government.8
Another example of the government continuing to litigate a matter
after having lost at the court of appeals level is found in the IRS's re-
sponse to an adverse decision in United States v. Morton.0 The court
in Morton found for the taxpayer on the issue of whether proceeds from
a fire insurance policy qualified for nonrecognition of gain under a sec-
tion 337 liquidation when the casualty occurred prior to the adoption
of the resolution to liquidate. The government refused to accept the
Morton decision as binding and relitigated the issue in Central Tablet
Manufacturing Co. v. United States;7 in that case the government lost
in the district court, but-won in the court of appeals and finally in the
Supreme Court.8
When the IRS litigated the designation of a particular transaction
as an "F" reorganization, the Fifth Circuit in 1966 held the transaction
was properly classified.9 In 1968 the same problem came before the
Ninth Circuit in two cases,10 and the IRS urged that court to find that
1. 428 F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1970) (per curiam), afj'g 52 T.C. 346 (1969).
2. 493 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), a!f'g 29 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 72-
759 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
3. 500 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir: 1974), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 204 (1976).
4. See Axelrod v. Commissioner, 507 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1975); Mutual Assur-
ance Soc'y v. Commissioner, 505 FR2d 128 (4th Cir. 1974).
5. 97 S. Ct. 204 (1976).
6. 387 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1968).
7. 339 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd, 481 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1973).
8. 417 U.S. 673 (1975).
9. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1022 (1967).
10. Associated Machine v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968); Estate
of Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968).
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the transaction was not an "F" reorganization. The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, followed the Fifth Circuit.1' The following year the IRS an-
nounced that it would not follow the three court of appeals decisions.'"
Two years later, when the Fifth Circuit was again faced with the ques-
tion, the IRS urged the court to reject the position it had adopted sev-
eral years earlier; the Fifth Circuit, however, adhered to its earlier posi-
tion.' 3 One of the grounds given was that the court could not overrule an
earlier decision of a panel, since only the court en banc could do that. 4
Later, both the Court of Claims' and the Sixth Circuit' 6 rejected the
government's position. After all these rejections, the IRS still included
the issue on its "List of Prime Issues" in November 1974; the government
has not given up even though the courts have refused to go along with
its position in every case since 1966.
After the passage of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, there
was a question whether an involuntary conversion through casualty was
a sale or exchange within the meaning of section 337. The Commis-
sioner adopted the position that it was not.17 The courts consistently
held against this position' 8 and, finally in 1964 in Revenue Ruling 64-
100, the Commissioner changed his position and revoked Revenue Rul-
ing 56-372, which had advocated the IRS view. Apparently the Com-
missioner was unable to get any court of appeals level court to go along
with him on this issue.
Another example of relitigation of an issue on the part of the gov-
ernment is found in a series of cases dealing with the right to sell prop-
erty of which a delinquent taxpayer is part owner. In Folsom v. United
States,19 the government lost on this issue, but the judgment did not
put the matter to 'rest. For ten years the government apparently kept
the matter open, and in United.States v. Kocher2 0 raised the same issue
and won.
In addition to the tax cases that have been mentioned, there are
other lines of cases in which the government has continued to litigate
11. See cases cited note 10 supra.
12. Rev. Rul. 69-185, 1969-1 C.B. 108, 109.
13. Home Constr. Corp. v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1'971).
14. Id. at 1169 n.5.
15. Movielab, Inc. v. United States, 494 F.2d 693 (CL Cl. 1974).
16. Performance Sys., Inc. v. United States, 501 F.2d 1338 (6th Cir. 1974).
17. Rev. Rul. 56-372, 1956-2 C.B. 187.
18. Kent Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1961); Towanda
Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 373 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
19. 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
20. 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a question of statutory construction after it has lost in the court of ap-
peals."1 Frankel Y. SEC2 2 dealt with the right of access to investigatory
files under the Freedom of Information Act. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit was first to face this problem and
concluded that the Act applied only if further adjudicatory proceedings
were imminent 3  The same result was reached by other coutts. 24 Yet
the government refused to accept the judicial interpretation and con-
tinued to urge that the Act be applied regardless of whether future ad-
judicatory proceedings were imminent; at least two circuits ultimately
adhered to this position.25
The government's policy of relitigating decided questions of law
is also evidenced in cases involving the National Labor Relations Board.
A study of litigation by this agency points out that in one matter the
Board's position was rejected in five courts of appeals, but the Board
nevertheless continued to adhere to its position even in those circuits
that had rejected it.26 In another matter involving an allegedly unfair
labor practice, the Board's position "has been rejected by at least five
circuits in a series of decisions from 1961 on."27  Still the Board re-
fused to budge on the matter and indicated it would continue in its posi-
tion until the United States Supreme Court ruled on the matter.28
Without doubt the government repeatedly has engaged in this
"stubborn persistence" in its refusal to follow adverse decisions of the
courts of appeals.2 9 This policy of relitigation after the government
21. The United States does not regard a decision of the United States Court of
Appeals as authoritative in the traditional common law sense. It is quite pre-
pared to continue to litigate in other circuits a question that has been resolved
in only one; even in the same circuit, the United States may be willing to re-litigate an issue if minor factual distinctions can be made between the pending
matter and the preceding decision. It appears to be the house rule of the Jus-
tice Department that three unanimous Courts of Appeals decisions are suffi-
cient to establish authoritatively that a government position is wrong.
Carrington, United States Appeals in Civil Cases: A Field and Statistical Study, 11 Hous.
L. REv. 1101, 1104 (1974).
22. 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972).
23. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
824 (1970).
24. See Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971); Cooney v. Sun Ship-
building & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
25. See Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972); Evans v. Department of
Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
26. C. SUMMERS, REPORT ON LABOR LAw CASES IN THE FEDERAL APPELLATE SYS-
TEM 13-14 (1974), cited in U.S. COMMISSION ON REvISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT AP-
PELLATE SYSTEM, STRucTuRE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CHANGE 138 n.26 (1975) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION ON REVISION].
27. COMMISSION ON REVISION, supra note 26, at 139.
28. Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., 201 N.L.R.B. 139, 142 n.12 (1973).
29. Zacks v. United States, 280 F.2d 829, 831 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
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has lost on a particular point should be given very careful consideration.
In many of the examples, the government has continued to lose, and
the cost/lack of benefits is clear. Society has paid a high price in dupli-
cative litigation, uncertainty, use of the energies of judges, attorneys
and litigants, and inequality in the application of the law. Even when
the government ultimately wins, there is still a question of whether the
benefit achieved, that is, vindication of the government's position, off-
sets the costs to society.
II. PRIOR DECISION AS CONTROLLING IN SUBSEQUENT
LITIGATION IN DIFFERENT COURT
A. Introduction
In any system of common law courts, an adjudication between
parties has a variety of effects. In the case before the court a judgment
determines the rights of the parties in the immediate controversy. A
judgment may also have an effect as the subject of review in a superior,
reviewing court.
Beyond the immediate litigation, a judgment may have an effect
on three different levels. First, the decision has impact as an adjudica-
tion on a point of law, as an increment in the development of the com-
mon law. In this way the law is created and developed.30  Secondly,
under the concept of preclusion/res judicata, the first judgment will
have a binding effect in subsequent litigation concerning the claim or
30. The building of the common law-the stare decisis effect-is especially impor-
tant. This principle has been articulated in R. VON MOSCHzsKER, STARE D)cISIs, RES
JUDICATA AND OTHER SELECTED EsSAYS 1 (1929) (quoting CHAMBERLAIN, STARE DEcisS
19) in the following terms:
A deliberate or solemn decision of a court or judge, made after argument
on a question of law fairly arising in a case, and necessary to its determination,
is an authority, or binding precedent, in the same court or in other courts of
equal or lower rank, in subsequent cases, where "the very point" is again in
controversy; but the degree of authority belonging to such a precedent depends,
of necessity, on its agreement with the spirit of the times or the judgment of
subsequent tribunals upon its correctness as a statement of the existing or ac-
tual law, and the compulsion or exigency of the doctrine is, in the last analysis,
moral and intellectual, rather than arbitrary or inflexible.
Stare decisis originated at least five hundred years ago and is still extremely impor-
tant in the common law jurisdictions. Id. at 1-29. It also serves some very important
ends. As Von Moschzisker said:
It expedites the work of the courts by preventing the constant reconsideration
of settled questions; it enables lawyers to advise their clients with a reasonable
degree of certainty and safety; it assures individuals that, insofar as they act on
authoritative rules of conduct, their contract and other rights will be protected
in the courts; and finally, it makes for equality of treatment of all men before
the law and lends stability to the judicial arm of government.
Id. at 2.
1977]
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issue involved in the first action. 1' Finally, an adjudication may be
controlling precedent for other courts; for example, a judgment by an
appellate court will be controlling on courts inferior to the appellate
court.
Relationships between courts are difficult in even the simplest ar-
rangement of courts, such as when there are only a supreme court and
a set of trial courts. The complexities of these relationships become
greater in scale in the three-tier federal system. In addition, the fed-
eral judicial system has changed in organization since its establishment
late in the eighteenth century so there is a time variable that must be
considered. Morever, the federal system has been and is composed of
several different levels of courts-district, circuit, circuit courts of
appeals, Supreme Court-existing in separate geographical areas, adding
a spatial variable;
The doctrine of controlling decision is easy to apply in some situa-
tions. Most simply, the decisions of a superior court are controlling
on inferior courts in the system; for example, federal district courts are
bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Application
is more complicated when the judicial system is more complex.
In any arrangement of courts in which there is more than one
court on a particular level, there is a problem of the effect that one
court must give to an earlier decision on a point of law rendered by
a court of equal stature. When one court has rendered a decision on
a point of law and that same question .is raised at a later time in another
court, the latter can (1) decide the question of law on the merits as
it perceives them and either concur in the earlier decision or reach a
different result, (2) defer to the earlier decision of the other court
without considering the merits of the controversy, 2 (3) give some pre-
sumption of correctness to the earlier decision in considering the merits
of the controversy, or (4) seek another method of resolving the question
if it feels that it cannot follow the earlier decision; for example, the
second court can certify the question to a higher court or reserve the
question for consideration by the entire panel of the deciding court.
Unless the same party is involved, res judicata/preclusion is not ap-
plicable, but the relationship of courts involves the same fundamental
considerations-saving the time and effort of the judges of the system
31. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. McKee, 416 F. Supp. 652, 655 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
32. See generally text accompanying notes 260-72 inIra.
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and avoiding conflicts of rulings, which are unseemly in a court sys-
tem-that undergird the concept of preclusion/res judicata.
B. Historical Perspective
1. Rules Applicable in English Courts
The English courts over the past centuries developed and applied
the general concepts of stare decisis, res judicata (known in some
circles as preclusion) and controlling decision. In the case of the latter
concept, one of the difficult problems was the effect to be given by one
court to a prior decision on a point of law of a coordinate court.
At the time the federal courts were developing law concerning
their relationship, the English courts were faced with the question of
the effect to be given to the decision of a coordinate court. There was
no statute or common law rule under which one court was bound to.
abide by the decision of another court of coordinate jurisdiction. 3
However, by the nineteenth century an opinion was expressed and fol-
lowed that as a matter of judicial comity a court should follow a decision
of a court of coordinate jurisdiction on a question of law. In The Vera
Cruz (No. 2)"4 the court stated, "But there is no statute or common
law rule by which one Court is bound to abide by the decision of an-
other of equal rank, it does so simply from what may be called comity
among judges."3 5
Some older cases also deal with this doctrine. In Parkin v.
Thorold3 6 the court mentioned the desirability of uniformity of deci-
sions.
I have repeatedly stated, that in my opinion uniformity of decision
was so important to be obtained, that whenever I found a decision
pronounced by one of the Vice-Chancellors, I should consider my-
self to be bound by that decision, where it related either to a new
matter or was not opposed by contradictory decisions, or on some
one of those principles of equity on which all decisions are founded;
and that I should do so, even though, if it had originally come be-
fore me uninfluenced by any such decision, I might have come to
a different conclusion.37
In In re Rouse & Co. and Meir & Co.38 the court dealing with
33. 19 H. HAIsBuRy, Tim LAWS OF ENGLAND 256 (2d ed. 1935).
34. [1884] 9 P.D. 96 (C.A.).
35. Id. at 98.
36. 11852] 96 Rev. R. 32.
37. Id. at 34.
38. 11871] L.R. 6 C.P. 211.
19"7] 129
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construction of a statute mentioned the certainty for individuals to be
gained by uniformity of decisions: "When once the construction of a
statute has been settled by a court of competent authority, it is expedi-
ent, for the sake of the suitors, that no doubt should be thrown upon
it by a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction."3 9  Several courts have ex-
pressed the opinion that "[wihen a case can be taken to a Court of
error, the decision of one Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction ought to be
binding on the others."40
Some federal courts considering the effect to be given to a judg-
ment of a coordinate court indicated that the federal courts should fol-
low the English practice "to the effect that each division accepts the
decisions of the other as of binding force, thereby avoiding the just
complaints, and the substantial detriment to the administration of the
law, which come from inconsistent proceedings of several tribunals of
like authority." '
2. Doctrine of Controlling Decision in the Federal Courts
a. Prior to 1891 Change in Courts
In order to understand the relationship between federal courts it
is necessary to understand the court structure that existed at various
times in the history of the country. -Initially, under the Judiciary Act
of 1789, there were three tiers of courts: the Supreme Court, the cir-
cuit courts and the district courts. The district courts were trial courts;
the circuit courts were both trial courts and appellate courts. There
were three circuits, the Eastern, Middle and Southern, and initially
these courts, composed of two Justices of the Supreme Court and a dis-
trict judge, "were courts of great power and dignity, and at an early
time. . . brought home to the people of every state a sense of national
judicial power through the presence of the Supreme Court Justices. ' 42
Circuit courts in the early days of the Republic were extensions
of the Supreme Court since Justices of the Supreme Court sat on the
circuit courts. When a circuit court, necessarily including a Justice of
the Supreme Court, ruled on a matter, it ill behooved another circuit
39. Id. at 219.
40. Taylor v. Burgess, [1859] 157 Eng. Rep. 1076. See also Casson v. Churehley,
[18841 53 LJ.Q.B. 335, 336; In re South Durham Iron Co. (Smith's Case) [18791 11
Ch. D. 579.
41. Duff Mfg. Co. v. Norton, 96 F. 986, 988 (C.C.D. Mass. 1899).
42. 1. MoORE, JUnicI. " Co: COMMENTARY 1 0.03(2), at 33-34 (1949).
130 [Vol. 55
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court to decide the same question in a different way. In 1793 Con-
gress provided that only a single Supreme Court Justice need sit on
a circuit court.
43
In the first half of the nineteenth century, Justice Story, sitting as
a Circuit Justice, c6nsidered the effect to be given an earlier judgment
of a coordinate court and stated,
The rule of comity always observed by the justices of the su-
preme court in cases, which admitted of being carried before the
whole court, was to conform to the opinions of each other, if any
had been given. Such decisions amounted to authority, which,
though not conclusive, were operative, whenever the question
should be carried up;. ... .4
Justice Story concluded that "although his mind was not without much
difficulty on this point, he should rule for the plaintiffs in conformity
with the opinion of Mr. Justice McLean.""
An early line of cases that considered the effect on a circuit court
of an earlier decision by a coordinate court dealt with the validity of
patents. In 1868 the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of New
York decided American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co.,46
which involved an alleged infringement of a patent. The court, in find-
ing for complainants, stated,
The questions raised in the case are so similar to those already con-
sidered in other actions founded upon the same patents, and es-
pecially in an action brought by the same complainants in the cir-
cuit court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, . . . and there
decided since the commencement of the present suit; that I feel re-
lieved of much of the responsibility which I should otherwise feel
in disposing of questions of this character. In the light of these
decisions, my way to a correct determination is not obscure.47
The court followed the Pennsylvania circuit court's conclusions con-
cerning certain patents. The court also referred to an earlier decision
43. Id. at 34.
44. Washburn v. Gould, 29 F. Cas. 312, 317 (No. 17,214) (C.C.D. Mass. 1844).
45. Id. Mr. Justice Story continued:
As to the points, which had been ruled by my brethren on other circuits, and
which I adopted from that just comity, which belongs to their learning and
ability, and which has long been adopted as a fit rule to govern me in my cir-
cuits, since I know of no higher authority except that of the supreme court of
the United States, I shall continue to adhere to their doctrine, as I have not
the presumption to suppose my own judgment entitled to more weight than
theirs.
Id. at 325.
46. 1 F. Cas. 728 (No. 320) (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1868), affd, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566(1873).
47. Id. at 729.
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in that circuit dealing with another aspect of the patent and followed
the earlier decision on that point. It is interesting that the New York
circuit court followed other circuit decisions in order both to strike
down and -to uphold the patents involved.
The effect of one circuit opinion on a judge in a different circuit
was discussed at length in Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Willis,48
a decision by Circuit Judge Emmons in November 1874. The court
listened to argument that it should entertain the action "wholly unem-
barrassed by judicial action elsewhere"49 and then responded that "with
much confidence" it retained the view it held at the commencement
of argument,
that in all the subordinate federal jurisdictions these questions
should be deemed at rest until the court of last resort should reverse
some of the judgments already rendered. We think the learned
counsel for the defendant much underrated the effect which it is
our duty to give to judgments pronounced by co-ordinate courts
where precisely the same points are brought in litigation before
us.
50
In 1882 district court Judge Brown, sitting as a circuit court judge
in a case of original jurisdiction, stated,
Upon general questions of law we .listen to the opinions of our
brother judges with deference, and with a desire to conform to
them if we can conscientiously do so, but we do not treat them as
conclusive. In patent causes, however, where the same issue has
been passed upon by the circuit court sitting in another district, it
is only in case of a clear mistake of law or fact, or newly-discovered
testimony, or upon some question not considered by such court,
that we feel at liberty to review its findings. 5'
The court entered judgment for complainant based on a prior deter-
mination in the southern district of New York.
The question of the effect to be given to an earlier decision on
patent validity finally came before the United States Supreme Court
in Mst, Foos & Co. v. -Stover Manufacturing Co. 2 The Court indi-
cated that federal courts had a responsibility to follow earlier decisions
of coordinate courts, stating,
The obligation to follow the decisions of other courts in patent
cases of course increases in proportion to the number of courts
48. 10 F. Cas. 754, 755-56 (No. 5603) (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1874).
49. Id. at 754.
50. Id. at 754-55.
51. Searls v. Worden, 11 F. 501, 502 (C.C.D. Mich. 1882).
52. 177 U.S. 485 (1900).
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which have passed upon the question, and the concordance of opin-
ion may have been so general as to become a controlling authority.
So, too, if a prior adjudication has followed a final hearing upon
pleadings and proofs, especially after a protracted litigation, greater
weight should be given to it than if it were made upon a motion
for a preliminary injunction. These are substantially the views em-
bodied in a number of well-considered cases in the Circuit Courts
and Circuit Courts of Appeals.53
This was an interesting point of view since it meant that a litigant in
the second suit, who may never have had a day in court on the issue
of validity of the patent, was to be bound by the earlier adjudication
of validity. The idea seemed to be that initial "protracted litigation'.'
would assure correctness of the determination. The:concept of binding
a person not a party to a suit was unusual and could.be justified consti-
tutionally only if it could be. assumed that the interests of the party to
be bound had been adequately represented in the first suit. 4
While the doctrine of controlling decision was applied in patent
cases, the same doctrine was held applicable in other types of cases.
In Cole Silver Mining Co. v. Virginia & Gold Hill Water Co.5 5 a circuit
judge had granted an injunction. In subsequent proceedings of ihe same
case the matter came before a Justice of the United States Supreme
Court sitting as a Circuit Justice. He was faced with the question of
whether he was bound by the earlier decision in the case. Justice
Field, considering the injunction that had been issued, stated,
The injunction, although preventive in form, is undoubtedly
mandatory in fact. It was intended to be so by the circuit judge
who granted it, and the objection which is now urged for its disso-
lution was presented to him, and was fully considered. I could not
with propriety reconsider his decision, even if I differed from him
in opinion. The circuit judge possesses ... equal authority with
myself in the circuit, and it would lead to unseemly conflicts, if the
rulings of one judge, upon a question of law, should be disregarded,
or be open to review by the other judge in the same case.5 6
After considering the prior applicable rulings of law, Justice Field de-
nied the motion to dissolve the injunction.
Although Cole Silver Mining involved only a single court, it did
involve different judges and the effect to be given to an earflier ruling.
53. Id. at 489.
54. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion: Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L Rlev. 357, 376
(1974).
55. 6 F. Cas. 72 (No. 2990) (C.C.D. Nev. 1871).
56. Id. at 74.
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The deferential attitude reflected in Field's opinion suggests the proper
course when one circuit court is faced with an earlier decision by
another circuit.
Justice Miller of the United States Supreme Court was sitting on
the circuit court that decided Wells v. Oregon Ry. & N. Co.57 Justice
Miller held that prior decisions by federal courts involving the right of
express companies to use railroad facilities were controlling in this liti-
gation. The court stated that until the Supreme Court decided the
matter, decisions of other circuit courts should be a guide.
In Reed v. Atlantic & P. R. Co.,"8 litigating the rights of stockhold-
ers, the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, following
the judgment of a coordinate court, stated, "it would be unseemly for
this court, in a suit upon the same lease, brought by one of the stock-
holders, to recover part of the same dividends, to hold the contrary.
Such a decision might result in two judgments against the defendants
in different jurisdictions, for the dividends."59  The court adopted a
rule from Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Willis" that "'every sug-
gestion of propriety and fit public action demands' that the decision of
the co-ordinate tribunal 'be followed until modified by the appellate
court.' "61
During the period immediately after the Civil War when the prob-
lem of deciding what effect to give to an earlier judgment was first be-
ing considered, some judges felt that they either could not or would
not follow earlier decisions by coequal courts. The rationales given in-
cluded (1) the duty to face and decide cases and not pass the responsi-
bility on to some other judge, (2) the opinion that coequal courts are
not controlling but rather are courts of different jurisdictions and com-
mand respect but not obedience, and (3) the desirability of diversity
so that a reviewing court would be able to consider all possibilities.
An example of this refusal to follow an earlier, supposedly control-
ling decision is found in Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Sanders,"
in which the judge obviously felt he was not obliged to follow the
earlier decision, as demonstrated in his statement:
57. 15 F. 561 (C.CQD. Ore. 1883).
58. 85 F. 692 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1884); 21 F. 283 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26,
1884) (case reported twice).
59. 85 F. at 693; 21 F. at 283-84 (wording not identical).
60. 10 F. Cas. 754 (No. 5603) (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1874).
61. 85 F. at 693; 21 F. at 284 (wording not identical) (both quoting 10 F. Cas.
at 755).
62. 47 F. 604 (C.C.D. Mont. 1891).
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Finally, plaintiff urges that, when one circuit court of the
United States decides a point, all the others should conform their
views to this decision, until the matter is settled by the rulings of
the supreme court. But this is not the rule which prevails in the
circuit courts of the United States .... A United States circuit
court undoubtedly always with reluctance will assert its right to dis-
agree with the decision of another circuit court, even when satisfied
that it is erroneous. I am aware that in refusing to concur with
the opinions of many able jurists expressed upon the construction
of said section 6, I, justly perhaps, subject myself to the charge of
presumption. I trust not, however, to the charge of having arrayed
myself with the growing army of cranks, who find so congenial a
home in our republican society; for I have no desire to be other
than conservative, and to adhere to the well-established rules for
construing a statute of the class under consideration. In not one
-of the decisions referred to as supporting the views of plaintiff is
there any discussion of the terms under consideration used in said
section 6, and they shown to have the force claimed; in none of
them a reference to the established rules for construing such stat-
utes. In the Bible there is the command: "Thou shalt not follow
a multitude to do evil."063
In some cases the refusal to follow an earlier decision was com-
pletely consistent with the doctrine of a controlling decision, as when
the refusal was based on an element that distinguished the instant case
from the earlier one. For example, the Circuit Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, in a patent case, refused to follow a Massachusetts
circuit court decision on the ground that the proof in the earlier case
was quite different from that in the Illinois case. The court said that
it would have felt "wholly bound" by the first decision had the evidence
been substantially the same.64
b. Controlling Decision Following 1891 Change
In 1891 an intermediate appellate court level, the circuit courts
of appeals, was created to relieve the Supreme Court of some of the
work that had been burdening it. The Act of March 3, 1891, created
nine circuits."5 Each circuit had a circuit court of appeals, which op-
erated as an intermediate appellate court. A member of the Supreme
63. Id. at 613-14.
64. Edgarton v. Furst & Bradley Mfg. Co., 9 F. 450, 452 (C.C.N.D. ]11. 1881).
See also Denny v. Dodson, 32 F. 899 (C.C.D. Ore. 1887).
65. The Act of February 9, 1893, created an additional circuit court of appeals for
the District of Columbia. J. MooRE, JuDIcw L CODE: COMmENTARY 0.03(51), at 455
(1949).
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Court assigned to the circuit and the circuit and district court judges
within the circuit were competent to sit as judges in the circuit court
of appeals. The act establishing the circuit courts of appeals author-
ized the naming of an additional circuit judge in each circuit to help
handle the judicial work of the new courts. The act also eliminated
any appellate jurisdiction in the old circuit courts; appeals from the dis-
trict courts would go to either the circuit court of appeals or the United
States Supreme Court.
Following the creation of the circuit courts of appeals in 1891 the
circuit courts still existed for some twenty years. This meant the fed-
eral courts were forced to make some decisions regarding the relation-
ship among courts in a rather complex court system. There were four
specific problems that faced the courts: (1) the problem of the rela-
tionship between circuit cotirts when one had rendered a judgment on
a point and the same problem then arose in another circuit court; this
was the same problem as the one that existed prior to 1891; (2) the
problem of a decision by a circuit court followed by a circuit court of
appeals facing the same legal question; (3) the problem of a decision
by a circuit court of appeals followed by litigation in a circuit court in-
volving the same legal question; and (4) the situation where a circuit
court of appeals had decided a particular question, and the same issue
then arose in another circuit court of appeals. This latter question is
the one that exists today and that deserves serious consideration.
C. Relationship Among Courts
1. Relationship Among Circuit Courts
Since the circuit courts continued to exist for twenty years after
the establishment of the circuit courts of appeals,60 the federal courts
still faced the problem during that period of the effect to be given by
one circuit court to an earlier circuit court decision. Circuit courts in
Massachusetts, 67 Vermont"8 and Pennsylvania" gave controlling effect.
to an earlier decision by another circuit court in every case including
cases involving such different factual situations as patents,70 freight
66. 1 Moons's FEDERAL PRAcrcE I 0.312], at 21 (2d ed. 1975).
67. Duff Mfg. Co. v. Norton, 96 F. 986 (C.C.D. Mass. 1899); Edison Elec. Light
Co. v. Beacon Vacuum Pump & Elec. Co., 54 F. 678 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893).
68. Grand Trunk Ry. v. Central Vt. R.R., 84 F. 66 (C.C.D. Vt. 1897).
69. F.B. Vandegrift & Co. v. United States, 164 F. 65 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1908); Mac-
Murray v. Gosney, 106 F. 11 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1901); Macbeth v. Gillinder, 54 F. 169
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1889).
70. Duff Mfg. Co. v. Norton, 96 F. 986 (C.C.D. Mass. 1899); Edison Elec. Light
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routes,71 an insolvent savings and loan association 72 and customs.73 The
reasons varied among the courts; in one of the patent cases the Ver-
mont circuit court stated,
The general rule is that where the validity of a patent has been
sustained by prior adjudication, and especially after a long, ardu-
ous, and expensive litigation, the only question open on motion for
a preliminary injunction in a subsequent suit against another de-
fendant is the question of infringement, the consideration of other
defenses being postponed until final hearing.74
This doctrine prevailed in this kind of situation even though a nonparty
to the first suit was affected by the judgment. Other courts relied on
comity, avoidance of confusion,75 time constraints of the courts,76 and
a belief that if the circuit court were not to be followed, the circuit court
of appeals should make that decision. 77
2. Circuit Court Decision Followed by Litigation in a
Circuit Court of Appeals
After the establishment of the circuit courts of appeals it was neces-
sary to establish the relationship between the newly established courts
and the old circuit courts. In McNeely v. Williams"8 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals was faced with an earlier decision by the Circuit
Court for the Southern District of New York that seemed to be control-
ling. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated,
This court as an appellate tribunal is not in the least concluded by
the decision in the New York case, nor do considerations of comity
toward a circuit court with respect to its rulings have the same
potency with a circuit court of appeals as they may properly have
with a circuit court when confronted with the alternative of follow-
ing or departing from the ruling of another circuit court.79
This assertion was a recognition of the superior position of the newly
created courts and a conclusion that logic required.
Co. v. Beacon Vacuum Pump & Elec. Co., 54 F. 678 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893); Macbeth
v. Gillinder, 54 F. 169 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1889).
71. Grand Trunk Ry. v. Central Vt. R.R., 84 F. 66 (C.C.D. Vt. 1897).
72. MacMurray v. Gosney, 106 F. 11 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1901).
73. F.B. Vandegrift & Co. v. United States, 164 F. 65 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1908).
74. Edison Elec. Light Co. v. Beacon Vacuum Pump & Elec. Co., 54 F. 678, 679
(C.C.D. Mass. 1893).
75. Grand Trunk Ry. v. Central Vt. R.R., 84 F. 66, 67 (C.C.D. Vt. 1897).
76. Cutter Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Anchor Elec. Co., 97 F. 804, 806-07 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1899), alf'd, 101 F. 120 (2d Cir. 1900).
77. F.B. Vandegrift & Co. v. United States, 164 V. 65, 70 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1908).
78. 96 F. 978 (3d Cir. 1899).
79. Id. at 982.
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Duplex Printing-Press Co. v. Campbell Printing Press & Manu-
facturing Co.,80 written by Judge Taft, posed the problem of prior
patent litigation in a circuit court. The circuit court of appeals was
forced to decide the effect of the circuit court decision both on subse-
quent litigation in the circuit court and on review of the circuit court
judgment in the circuit court of appeals. Judge Taft declared,
The judgment of the circuit court of Massachusetts is entitled to
the same consideration in this court, as a reason. for granting the
preliminary injunction, as it had in the court below. . . . Upon
a final hearing upon the merits, it would be different; for then con-
siderations of comity might properly have weight with the court be-
low, which we should not hesitate, as an appellate court, to disre-
gard in finally settling the rights of the parties ...
. ..It has been decided in this court, and in the courts of
appeals of the Second and Seventh circuits, that an adjudication
of another circuit court than that whose action is being considered,
finding the validity of the patent and its infringement, is a sufficient
ground, not only in the circuit court for an order granting a prelim-
inary injunction, but also in the appellate court for affirming such
an order.81
The circuit court of appeals was considering the effect to be given a
decision by a circuit court in another circuit. The facts that a patent
was involved and that both a preliminary injunction and a final adjudi-
cation were being sought are significant in analyzing Taft's deference
to the prior decision.
United States v. Stone & Downer Co. 2 was similar procedurally
to the Duplex case. The First Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with
a prior decision by a circuit court in another circuit. The circuit court
decision below had followed the earlier decision of the other circuit
court. The First Circuit Court of Appeals delineated both its obliga-
tion and the obligation of the circuit court that had followed the prior
decision, stating, "This it clearly was justified in doing, whether or not
it fully approved that decision. On the other hand, being a decision
only of the circuit court, it does not stand as an authority binding
us."'83 The court clearly demonstrated the higher position of the circuit
court of appeals vis-4-vis the circuit courts.
80. 69 F. 250 (6th Cir. 1895).
81. Id. at 252-55.
82. 175 F. 33 (Ist Cir. 1909).
83. Id. at 35.
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3.. Circuit Court of Appeals Decision Followed by Litigation
in a Circuit Court
Since the circuit court of appeals was established as an appellate
court over the circuit courts, the inferior position of the latter was ap-
parent. However, the relationship of an appellate court in one circuit
to a circuit court in another still posed a question of the :reach of an
appellate decision beyond the circuit in which the circuit court of ap-
peals was sitting.
The question was soon raised. Shortly after the establishment of
the circuit courts of appeals, the circuit court in Maine had a case in
which an apparently controlling decision had been handed down by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Although the circuit
court was uncertain at first about the effect to be given the earlier judg-
ment, it finally concluded that the judgment was controlling.84
The next year the circuit court in Massachusetts was faced with
a case in which an earlier judgment by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit was seemingly controlling. 5 The court relied on
an opinion from the First Circuit, Beach v. Hobbs,s" to the effect that
Although the defendants in this case are not the same or in privity
with the defendants in the other cases, we think, as a general rule,
and especially in patent cases,.we should follow the decision of the
circuit court of appeals of another circuit upon final hearing with
respect to the issues determined, if based upon substantially the
same state of facts, unless it should clearly appear that there was
manifest error.87
The circuit court continued,
The circuit courts and the circuit courts of appeals throughout
the United States are of equal dignity and therefore we are unable
to perceive any reason why, unless in cases of clear error or over-
sight, each of these courts should not follow the rule practiced in
the two divisions of the court of appeal, sitting under the English
judicature acts, to the effect that each division accepts the decisions
of the other as of binding force, thereby avoiding the just com-
plaints, and the substantial detriment to the administration of the
law, which come from inconsistent proceedings of several tribunals
of like authority. 88
84. Fairfield Floral Co. v. Bradbury, 89 F. 393 (C.C.D. Me. 1898).
85. Duff Mfg. Co. v. Norton, 96 F. 986 (C.C.D. Mass. 1899).
86. 92 F. 146 (1st Cir. 1899).
87. Id. at 147, quoted in Duff Mfg. Co. v. Norton, 96 F. at 988.
88. Duff Mfg. Co. v. Norton, 96 F. at 988.
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The situation was replicated in the circuit court in Ohio in a patent
case.8 9  An earlier decision had been rendered by the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The court followed the earlier deci-
sion, stating that "the authority of the decision of the New York circuit
court and the circuit court of appeals ...would be of controlling
weight in this hearing both on the principles of comity and also as ad-
judications entitled to the greatest respect.""0
The same position was adopted by circuit courts in Missouri, 1
New York92 and Ohio,93 in cases involving patents,94 liability of stock-
holders95 and will construction. 6 Authority for the contrary position
was not nearly so great in weight or so persuasive.9 7
4. Relation Among Circuit Courts of Appeals
(Later Courts of Appeals)
Following the establishment of the circuit courts of appeals in
1891 and the abolition of the circuit courts in 1911, the federal judicial
system had symmetry and logic. The district courts were the base-line
trial courts. Appeals were generally to the circuit courts of appeals.
The Supreme Court was the apex of the court system and was available
to establish the corpus juris of the federal system. Still the question
of the effect to be given an earlier decision by a circuit court of appeals
when the matter was raised in later litigation in a coordinate court was
troublesome. Various intermediate appellate courts faced the question
and answered it in various ways.
89. National Folding-Box & Paper Co. v. Dayton Paper Novelty Co., 95 F. 991
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1899).
90. Id. at 996.
91. New York Filter Mfg. Co. v. Jackson, 112 F. 678 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1900).
92. The Fayerweather Will Cases, 118 F. 943 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902), af 'd sub
nom. Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276 (1904); Hale v. Hilliker, 109 F. 273
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1901).
93. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Holland, 143' F. 903 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1906);
National Folding-Box & Paper Co. v. Dayton Paper Novelty Co., 95 F. 991 (C.C.S.D.
Ohio 1899).
94. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Holland, 143 F. 903 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1906);
New York Filter Mfg. Co. v. Jackson, 112 F. 678 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1900); National Fold-
ing-Box & Paper Co. v. Dayton Paper Novelty Co., 95 F. 991 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1899).
95. Hale v. Hilliker, 109 F. 273 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1901).
96. The Fayerweather Will Cases, 118 F. 943 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902), alf'd sub
nom. Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276 (1904).
97. See Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. American Fur Ref. Co., 120 F. 672, 674
(C.C.D.NJ.) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 123 F. 869 (3d Cir. 1903), ajf'd, 198
U.S. 399 (1905); Welsbach Light Co. v. Cosmopolitan Incandescent Gaslight Co., 100
F. 648, 649 (C.C.N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 104 F. 83 (7th Cir. 1900).
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a. First Circuit
Within" a short period after the establishment of the circuit courts
of appeals in 1891, the First Circuit court was faced with the problem
of the effect to be given to an earlier adjudication by another circuit
court of appeals. In a patent case, Beach v. Hobbs,98 the court fol-
lowed a Second Circuit decision and adopted the general rule, to be
applied especially in patent cases, that circuit courts of appeals should
follow one another if the case was based on substantially the same
set of facts, unless the earlier decision was clearly in error.
About the same time, the court had before it a patent case in
which a prior decision in another circuit seemed controlling.99  The
court reiterated its position:
Where the prior adjudication comes from a court of final authority,
like the circuit court of appeals in any circuit, and has stood for
a series of years, the rule thus stated in Beach v. Hobbs is re-en-
forced by the additional considerations [of stare decisis, public pol-
icy and laches] . . . . In the case at bar it will be found that
all the considerations which give weight to prior adjudications, so
far as they relate to the validity of certain claims in the patent in
issue, have full force.' 00
The same conclusion was reached in Gill v. Austin,'' a tax case in
which the court said, "[W]e refer to our practice, as stated many times,
with reference to our disposition to follow decisions of the Circuit
Courts of Appeals in other circuits whenever they can form a prece-
dent. In accordance with that practice, we hold that the United States
cannot prevail."'11 2  This attitude was repeated by the court the next
year in a customs case in which the court deferred to a decision by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.10 3 The following year
the court again applied the same doctrine and followed the decision
of three circuit courts of appeals. This time it was the Second, Third
and Seventh Circuits, and the court referred to the "well-settled rules
in this circuit in regard to following the decisions of. . . other circuits
unless under especially exceptional circumstances."'0 4
98. 92 F. 146 (1st Cir. 1899), afrd, 180 U.S. 383 (1901).
99. Hatch Storage Battery Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 100 . 975 (1st Cir.
1900). See also Bresnahan v. Tripp Giant Leveller Co., 99 F. 280 (1st Cir. 1900).
100. Hatch Storage Battery Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 100 F. at 976-77.
101. 157 F. 234 (1st Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 218 U.S. 677 (1910).
102. Id. at 235.
103. United States v. F.A. Marsily & Co., 165 F. 186 (1st Cir. 1908).
104. Kinney v. Conant, 166 F. 720, 721 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 526
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Apparently the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit next
spoke to the matter in 1934, in two cases, one involving tax matters,
10 5
the other a bankruptcy case.10 6  In both the court followed the deci-
sions of other circuit courts of appeals. The court, however, seemed
to be backing away from an absolute rule on the matter stating, "While
we are not bound to follow the decision of another circuit, it is the rule
in this circuit that we will do so when the question decided involves
the construction of a federal statute, unless we are of the opinion that
it is clearly wrong.'1 0 7 The court explained that it would follow the
decision unless it had a "clear conviction" that the earlier decision was
wrong.108
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit refused to follow two ear-
lier decisions by other courts of appeals in Round v. Commissioner,'"° a
case involving the taxability of accumulated trust income. The tax-
payer argued the controlling nature of the earlier decisions, and the
Commissioner conceded "that these cases directly support petitioners'
argument that accumulated trust income is not includible in decedent's
gross estate, but urges that these cases were wrongly decided and
should not be followed by this court."" 0 The Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit considered the matter, agreed with the IRS and re-
fused to go along with the earlier decisions. In this case the Commis-
sioner's policy of relitigation"' resulted in a conflict in the circuits con-
cerning the point.
The next time the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit spoke
on the effect of a prior decision in another circuit was in United States
v. Mitchell."2 In this criminal case the court refused to follow an ap-
parently controlling decision rendered by the Seventh Circuit, simply
indicating that the decision of another circuit was not controlling in that
circuit.13
(1909), cert. denied, 218 U.S. 677 (1910) (citing Gill v. Austin, 157 F. 234 (1st Cir.
1907), cert. denied, 218 U.S. 677 (1910)).
105. Gottlieb v. White, 69 F.2d 792 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 657 (1934).
106. Sherman & Son v. Corin, 73 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1934).
107. Id. at 470.
108. Id.
109. 332 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964).
110. Id. at 595.
111. The Commissioner was ultimately vindicated in United States v. O'Malley, 383
U.S. 627 (1966).
112. 432 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
113. Id. at 356.
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b. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals first faced the matter of a
controlling decision in litigation involving a customs matter. Initially
the Second Circuit had held that temporarily strung beads were not
subject to duty.114 After that decision the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals had reached the opposite result, holding that such beads were tax-
able." 5 In a later case, Henry E. Frankenberg Co. v. United States,"06
the Second Circuit commented that its initial decision was first in time,
that it was not persuaded by the opinion of the Seventh Circuit and
that it would adhere to its position and leave it to the Supreme Court
to make the law uniform.
Several years later the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was faced
with litigation involving the Federal Safe Appliance Act regarding
which there was an earlier controlling decision by the Circuit Court. of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit."17  The Second Circuit elected to fol-
low the earlier decision, stating, "[I]n view of the desirability of uni-
formity in the decisions of -the courts of the different circuits in inter-
preting this act, we feel it our duty to follow the decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. . . . The facts in that case
are very similar to those appearing here." ' s
The next year in an insurance case the Second Circuit summarily
affirmed a decision of a district court because "we are very far from
being clear in our convictions that the Court of Appeals in the Ninth
Circuit erred in its construction of the contract." 1 9 This suggests that
substantial weight was given to the earlier decision by the other circuit
court of appeals.
The Second Circuit rejected the doctrine of controlling decision
in the late 1920's in a case involving the claim of a brewery for a tax
deduction for obsolescence of good will after the passage of prohibi-
tion.120 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals earlier had considered
a similar claim on behalf of a brewery and rejected it.' 2' The Board
114. Steiner v. United States, 79 F. 1003 (2d Cir. 1895) (mem.).
115. United States v. Buettner, 133 F. 163 (7th Cir. 1904).
116. 146 F. 63 (2d Cir. 1906) (per curiam), aff'd, 206 U.S. 224 (1907).
117. Erie R.R. v. Russell, 183 F. 722 (2d Cir. 1910), cert. denied, 220 U.S. 607
(1911).
118. Id. at 725-26.
119. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc'y v. Stanton, 191 F. 813, 815 (2d Cir. 1911).
120. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 30 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1929),
rev'd, 280 U.S. 384 (1930).
121. Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willicuts, 15 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied,
273 U.S. 763 (1927).
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of Tax Appeals considered the same question and concurred in the con-
clusion of the Eighth Circuit.122  In 1928 the Ninth Circuit followed
the Eighth on the point involved. 2 3 Early in 1929, however, the Sec-
ond Circuit had the same matter before it and concluded that a brewery
was entitled to the deduction.124 The court, composed of Judges
Manton,125 Learned Hand and Swan, refused to follow the decision of
the Eighth Circuit or any subsequent decision. The language of the
Second Circuit in rejecting the doctrine of controlling decision is inter-
esting in showing the attitude of the court: "Much as we respect the
considered decisions of other circuits, we conceive that our duty re-
quires us to form an independent judgment in cases of first impression
in our own court, and forbids us blindly to follow other circuits, when
our minds are not persuaded by the arguments advanced.' 20  The
court then indicated that the Supreme Court could "exercise its appro-
priate function" to reconcile differences between circuits and deter-
mine the proper interpretation of this important section of the tax
code. 127
The Supreme Court did in fact reverse the decision of the Second
Circuit.1 28  At the time the Second Circuit was considering the matter,
the Third Circuit was also faced with the same problem, and the latter
court indicated that it was persuaded by the earlier decision of the
Eighth Circuit, although it was aware of the decisions reaching the op-
posite conclusion. 20
In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB 80 the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals faced a problem concerning which there seemed
to be a controlling decision by the Court of Appeals for the District
122. Manhattan Brewing Co., 6 B.T.A. 952 (1927).
123. Landsberger v. McLaughlin, 26 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1928).
124. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 30 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1929),
rev'd, 280 U.S. 384 (1930).
125. For a discussion of Judge Manton see Vestal, A Study in Perfidy, 35 IND. L.J.
17 (1959). Judge Manton obviously had very interesting ideas about the proper rela-
tionship of judges in the federal system. See especially the discussion of the Fox The-
atres Corporation case (Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479 (1933)), id. at 22-
24, and the IRT receivership case (American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough
Rapid Transit Co., 4 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1933)), id. at 24-27.
126. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 30 F.2d at 222.
127. Id.
128. Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930) (decision
on merits as Supreme Court saw them).
129. Renziehausen v. Commissioner, 31 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1929), aff'd, 280 U.S.
387 (1930).
130. 380 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1967).
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of Columbia Circuit."31 The Second Circuit considered the question at
length and ultimately distinguished and determined not to follow the
earlier decision by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. 32
In the case before the Second Circuit the court stated,
This court has said that "the law of collateral estoppel is
'growing law.' ". . . Nevertheless judicial aversion to forum shop-
ping is not a sufficient ground for precluding litigation of a question
of law by extending the doctrine of res judicata into areas tradi-
tionally governed by "the ordinary rule of stare decisis." . .. We
therefore consider ourselves free "to make an independent exam-
ination of the legal matters at issue."'183
The court isolated the central question in the problem: should the or-
dinary rules of stare decisis control when federal courts of appeals are
'involved, or should additional factors be fed into the computations?
Petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was granted in Pan
American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, but unfortunately one Justice
was not able to participate in the decision, and the Court split evenly.' 34
This had the effect of affirming the decision of the court of appeals
but meant that no controlling precedent was established. The final
word came through an act of Congress that had the effect of overruling
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.135
The need for uniformity in the decisions of the federal courts was
recognized by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in another
case with the identical style, Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.
CAB, "'36 involving rates for international air carriers. In an earlier case
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit the same
question had been raised and decided in favor of the government. The
Second Circuit observed, "Although we are not bound by the decision
or the rationale of the [District of Columbia court], we do find much
of its reasoning persuasive."' 3 7  The court also warned against Pan
Am's tactics:
131. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 365 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
132. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 380. 2d 770, 774-77 (2d Cir.
1967), aft'd by an equally divided Court per curiam sub hbm. World Airways, Inc. v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 391 U.S. 461 (1968).
133. Id. at 776-77.
134. Sub nom. World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 391 U.S.
461 (1968).
135. Act of Sept. 26, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-514, 82 Stat. 867 (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1301(33) & 1371(e) (6) (1970)).
136. 517 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1975).
137. Id. at 741.
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Possibly petitioners chose to appeal the B6ard's ruling. . . in
this Circuit in the hopes of finding a court more inclined toward
their view. Such "forum shopping" should be discouraged. While
we do view the issues from a fresh and unbiased viewpoint, we are
cognizant of Congressional intent to set a national policy with re-
gard to charter flight operations.13
The court reiterated its position, noting, "Congress expected the air-
lines to be regulated from the CAB in Washington, not from eleven
different circuits."''3 The court concluded by finding in favor of the
government 140 in accordance with the prior court of appeals opinion.
c. Third Circuit
Soon after the establishment of the circuit courts of appeals, the
Third Circuit court was faced with a problem of deciding how much
effect to give to an earlier decision by a circuit court in another circuit.
Recognizing that the latter court was inferior to the circuit court of ap-
peals, the court stated,
This court as an appellate tribunal is not in the least concluded by
the decision in the [circuit court] case, nor do considerations of.
comity toward a circuit court with respect to its rulings have the
same potency with a circuit court of appeals as they may properly
have with a circuit court when confronted with the alternative of
following or departing from the ruling of another circuit court. 14'
This position is completely consistent with the controlling decision doc-
trine since that doctrine involves coordinate courts and not those of dif-
ferent levels.
In the period following the establishment of the circuit courts of
appeals, the Third Circuit was faced with several cases raising the ques-
tion of the application of the controlling decision doctrine. In Mc-
Coach v. Philadelphia Trust, Safe Deposit & Insurance Co.,142 a tax
case, the court was confronted with an earlier, apparently controlling
decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The
Third Circuit followed the Second Circuit, explaining,
We base this ruling, not upon comity merely, but upon the ground
that in suits of this character uniformity in the judgments of the
several Courts of Appeals is especially important, and should
138. Id.
139. Id. at 745.
140. Id. at 746.
141. McNeely v. Williames, 96 F. 978, 982 (3d Cir. 1899).
142. 142 F. 120 (3d Cir. 1905).
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be maintained wherever, as in the present instance there has been
no decision of the Supreme Court which precludes it.143
A few years later, in 1908, the same court, then following a decision
of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, stated,
In suits of this character, uniformity in the judgments of the courts
of the first instance, as well as in those of the appellate tribunals,
is desirable, and where no direct attack has been made upon a prior
adjudication by a Circuit Court of the question sought to be subse-
quently raised in a similar suit we think that the prior adjudication,
unless clearly erroneous, should be followed.144
The same rationale was utilized by the Third Circuit again in 1908 in
a customs case in which the court indicated it would follow an earlier
decision in order to maintain uniformity and avoid confusion in tariff
construction at the different points of entry.145  But there was not
unanimity in the circuit; two years later, in another customs case, the
circuit court of appeals reversed a circuit court decision that dutifully
had followed an earlier Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision. In
reversing, the court did not mention the supposedly controlling earlier
decision. 146
On the question of allowance of a tax deduction for obsolescence
of a brewery's good will after prohibition, the Third Circuit followed
the Eighth Circuit's lead, even though the Second Circuit, in a contem-
poraneous case, refused to follow that earlier decision. The Third Cir-
cuit indicated that it knew that the Eighth Circuit decision was not
unanimously accepted but was persuaded by it nonetheless. 147
Two years later in Arlac Dry Stencil Corp. v. A.B. Dick Co.,' 48
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals deferred to an earlier decision of
the Second Circuit. It is noteworthy in this case that the court recog-
nized that because the parties were the same the earlier decision was
res judicata (issue preclusion) on certain issues in the case. The court
then referred to a second decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit and stated,
That case, not being between the same parties, does not conclude
the defendants. Neither is it binding on this court, yet through
143. Id. at 121.
144. Hill v. Francklyn & Ferguson, 162 F. 880, 881 (3d Cir. 1908).
145. Alexander Murphy & Co. v. United States, 162 F. 871, 872 (3d Cir. 1908).
146. United States v. Wanamaker, 175 F. 900 (3d Cir. 1910), rev'g 169 F. 664
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1909).
147. Renziehausen v. Commissioner, 31 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1929), affd, 280 U.S.
387 (1930); see text accompanying notes 120-29 supra.
148. 46 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1931).
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comity is very persuasive. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co.,
177 U.S. 488 ....
For these reasons, briefly stated, we discern no error in the
court's finding that the decree in the Second Circuit is res judicata
of the issues in this case.1 49
d. Fourth Circuit
Apparently the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did not
speak to the question of the effect to be given to an earlier decision
by another court of appeals for almost half a century. In 1939 in the
case of United States v. Flannery'5" the court of appeals in a per curiam
decision affirmed a district court decision that had stated that it was
customary in that district to follow the decision of another court of ap-
peals when there was no contrary ruling of equal or greater judicial
authority.15 ' The court of appeals did not articulate its reasons for
adopting the district court decision. The prior decision was a ruling
in favor of a taxpayer that the Commissioner was unwilling to accept; 15 2
the litigation was a result of the IRS relitigation policy.
A few years later in litigation concerning an insurance policy51
the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the decision of another circuit
court of appeals would be of persuasive weight, but stated, "[W]e must
make our decision upon the facts presented to us and may not be bound
by the findings of another court however similar the circumstances may
be."' 54 The court found the earlier decision factually to be "so dissimi-
lar that a decision in one would not be a precedent for the other."'5 ,
More recently the court was faced with antitrust litigation about
which a number of courts of appeals had adopted a particular posi-
tion. 5 6 The court of appeals, in following the earlier controlling
decisions, stated, "Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that
we should follow the course outlined in the other circuits in deciding
the question in the case at bar.'- 5 7  That statement is typical; on the
few occasions when it has addressed the problem of the controlling de-
149. Id. at 902.
150. 106 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
151. Flannery v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 677, 681 (D. Md. 1938).
152. See text accompanying notes 1-20 supra.
153. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v,.Ayers, 163 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1947).
154. Id. at 863.
155. Id.
156. North Carolina Theatres, Inc. v. Thompson, .277 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1960).
157. Id. at 676 (footnot4omitted).
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cision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has apparently acceded -to
the thrust of the policy.
e. Fifth Circuit
Of all the courts of appeals, the Fifth Circuit seems to have been
the most reluctant to follow a controlling decision handed down by an-
other court of appeals. The court has genuflected in the direction of
the policy but the holdings have not upheld it. In Sokol Brothers Fur-
niture Co. v. Commissioner5" the court acknowledged the existence
of the doctrine but then rejected it, stating that the decision of another
court of appeals is "properly entitled to great weight and itself affords
persuasive argument in the determination of the present case. How-
ever, after full consideration we are unable to follow [the case decided
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit]."' 59  Judicial attitudes
such as represented by Sokol Brothers Furniture encouraged the gov-
ernment's policy of relitigation. Here the conflict between the two pol-
icies was clear and relitigation won out.
In C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. Barnes60 the Seventh Circuit
had reached certain conclusions about venue and patent litigation.
When identical issues faced the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that
court refused to follow the Seventh Circuit. 161 Even though the Sev-
enth Circuit decision was affirmed by an evenly divided Supreme
Court, the Fifth Circuit indicated that it would refuse to follow the Sev-
enth Circuit decision even after it had been affirmed by the Supreme
Court because of the nature of the affirmance. 62 It should be noted
that the last statement of the Fifth Circuit was only an alternative
ground for the decision reached.
Shortly after the patent litigation just discussed, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit was faced with a case 6 ' under the Food and
Drug Act in which an apparently controlling decision had been ren-
dered by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Fifth Cir-
cuit commented on the practice of according great weight and persua-
siveness to an earlier decision vhen an identical issue is presented in
158. 185 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1950).
159. Id. at 224.
160. 194 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.), affd mem. sub nom. Cardox Corp. v. C-O-Two Fire
Equip. Co., 344 U.S. 861 (1952).
161. Guiberson Corp. v. Garrett Oil Tools, Inc., 205 F.2d 660 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 346 U.S. 886 (1953).
162. Id. at 665.
163. Florida Citrus Exch. v. Folsom, 246 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1957).
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the second case and no different principle is involved. 6 4 The court,
however, held that since a different factual issue was before the court
it would not follow the earlier decision.
The next time the doctrine of the controlling decision was faced
in the Fifth Circuit was in a series of patent suits leading to Bros Inc.
v. W.F. Grace Manufacturing Co.'s5 The court of appeals stated
forcefully that it would not follow the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit on a patent matter.16 6 The court commented
that, "This is apparently an inescapable consequence of our case or
controversy approach, and the hierarchical independence of each of the
Circuits.' 67  The court noted that this litigation had occupied the at-
tention of not fewer than twenty-five judges in three different cir-
cuits.168 Two factors were mentioned in the course of this decision.
One was the desirability of exerting "resourceful ingenuity in finding
ways to maintain the quality of our celebrated system of justice without
squandering precious and limited judge-time .... ,,169 The other was
the idea that the Supreme Court could reconcile the conflicting circuits
by deciding specific cases and articulating standards. 170
Most recently the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated its posi-
tion in a housing discrimination case: "Perhaps counsel is not aware
that this Court is bound only by decisions of this Circuit and the Su-
preme Court of the United States."'171 Although the court continued
that the requirements of the controlling decision by another circuit had
been complied with so that there was no conflict, 72 the clear message
was that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the idea that it
might be bound by an earlier decision by another court of appeals.
f. Sixth Circuit
The authority on the controlling decision doctrine is extremely
sparse in the Sixth Circuit. In Reo Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner,17
a tax case, the court refused to follow an earlier decision by the Fifth
164. Id. at 856.
165. 351 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1965).
166. Id. at 210.
167. Id. at 210 n.4.
168. Id. at 209 n.1.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 210 n.3.
171. United States v. Northside Realty Ass'n, 518 F.2d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1975).
172. Id.
173. 170 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1948), affd, 338 U.S. 442 (1950).
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Circuit and explained that the earlier decision was "advisory ...
rather than controlling in our conclusion .... This apparently
is the only comment of the Sixth Circuit on the problem.
g. Seventh Circuit
Early in this century the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, facing the question of a seemingly controlling decision ren-
dered by another circuit court of appeals, said that one of the parties
was right "in claiming that he is entitled to our independent considera-
tion and judgment.1 75  Nonetheless, the court reached the same con-
clusion as had the other circuit court of appeals in the earlier decision.
About two decades later in a fraud case the court supported a con-
trary principle, indicating that comity and the desirability of uniformity
should lead to deference to an earlier decision by a court of coordinate
jurisdiction when "no insuperable obstacle appears.' 76 The court in
this case did, in fact, follow the earlier decision.
About thirty years later the Seventh Circuit again faced the ques-
tion of a controlling decision by another court of appeals and refused
to follow the decision. 177  In the case the court stated, "[w]e think
the decision of the Fifth Circuit in this matter is erroneous. Such being
the case, we are under no more obligation to follow it as the law of
the case than that circuit would be to follow what it considers an errone-
ous decision by this court.'1 78 The fact that this case involved the same
parties as the first litigation in the other circuit does not undercut the
thrust of the rejection of the controlling decision doctrine.
A few years later in a case involving the right of the government
to assert a federal tax lien on jointly held property and the manner in
which the right of the federal government can be asserted, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to follow an earlier decision
by the Fifth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit, after carefully examining
the problem, concluded it would reach its own decision even though the
Fifth Circuit had reached a "contrary view."'1 79  In a series of cases
174. Id. at 1004.
175. Heckendorn v. United States, 162 F. 141, 143 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 214 U.S.
514 (1908).
176. Ball v. Chapman, 1 F.2d 895, 896 (7th Cir. 1924).
177. Blaski v. Hoffman, 260 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1958), affd, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
178. Id. at 322.
179. United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1964).
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following this decision, at least three other circuits, the Fourth,8 0
Ninth' 81 and Second, 82 reached the same conclusion that the Seventh
had reached.
Ten years later, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit again
articulated an attitude against the doctrine of controlling decision.' 83
The Seventh Circuit seemed securely in the camp of those rejecting
the doctrine until a recent decision, of importance because of the com-
position of the panel that decided it. In Federal Life Insurance Co.
v. United States"" the Seventh Circuit was faced with litigation involv-
ing a refund of taxes allegedly overpaid. The court of appeals, finding
for the taxpayer, noted that a number of courts including one court of
appeals had accepted the argument that the taxpayer was making. The
court stated,
Respect for the decisions of other circuits is especially important
in tax cases because of the importance of uniformity, and the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals of another circuit should be followed
unless it is shown to be incorrect, Goodenow v. Commissioner, 238
F.2d 20 (8th Cir' 1956). In this case we believe the Fifth Circuit
to have been demonstrably correct.' 85
The intriguing thing about this per curiam decision is that the panel
deciding the case included Judge John Paul Stevens, who was a circuit
judge at the commencement of the appeal but who was Circuit Justice
when the opinion was handed down. This decision suggests that the
doctrine of controlling decision has vitality at least in the opinion of
one Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
h. Eighth Circuit
Shortly after the establishment of the circuit courts of appeals in
1891, the newly established Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced
with the question of the effect to be given by a circuit court to an earlier
decision by another judge sitting in that circuit court. 180 In Shreve v.
Cheesman the Eighth Circuit judge at the trial level had refused to fol-
180. Washington v. United States, 402 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 978 (1971).
181. United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970).
182. United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
931 (1973).
183. United States v. Nickels, 502 F.2d 1173, 1176-77 (7th Cir. 1974).
184. 527 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1975) (per euriam).
185. Id. at 1098-99.
186. Shreve v. Cheesman, 69 F. 785 (8th Cir. 1895), cert. denied, 163 U.S. 704,
appeal dismissed, 17 S. Ct. 998 (1896).
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low the earlier decision. 8 7 On appeal, the circuit court of appeals dis-
cussed at length the duty of one court to follow the earlier decision
of a coordinate court. The court observed,
It is a principle of general jurisprudence that courts of concur-
rent or co-ordinate jurisdiction will follow the deliberate decisions
of each other, in order to prevent unseemly conflicts, and to pre-
serve uniformity of decision and harmony of action. This principle
is nowhere more firmly established or more implicitly followed than
in the circuit courts of the United States. A deliberate decision
of a question of law by one of these courts is generally treated as
a controlling precedent in every federal circuit court in the Union,
until it is reversed or modified by an appellate court.'88
The court then determined that the first court had erred in its interpre-
tation of the law and refused to impose that misinterpretation on the
litigants in the second action to their detriment. Rather the court, ex-
ercising its appellate review, indicated what it believed the law was and
allowed the litigant to *meet the requirements of the law so that he
would not suffer because of the change in interpretation of the statutory
provision. The analysis in this case addressed the situation where a
circuit court decision is followed by litigation at the same level at which
the same question is raised. With the establishment of the circuit
courts of appeals, the same dilemma arose at that level; the new courts
were soon faced with the question of what effect each of them should
give to an earlier decision by another circuit court of appeals.
In 1918 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit con-
fronted the question of the effect to be afforded an earlier decision by
another court of the same level.18 9 The court opted for following the
earlier decision, stating:
In deciding questions of policy and practice which involve no
vital moral issue, certainty in the law and uniformity of decision
are often more essential to the wise administration of justice and
to the interests of business men than a particular policy or practice.
Where the correct decision of such a question is doubtful, and one
of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals has decided it in
a considered opinion, it is the duty of the others to follow that deci-
sion, unless it clearly appears to them, or to some of them, to be
unfair or unwise, and it is the duty of the courts at all times, in
the consideration of such issues, to lean towards uniformity of deci-
sion and practice. 190
187. Id. at 787.
188. Id. at 790.
189. Bright v. Arkansas, 249 F. 950 (8th Cir. 1918).
190. Id. at 952.
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This position was consistent with the decision and the dicta in Shreve
v. Cheesman.'91
After 1918 the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, almost without exception, followed the principle of deferring
to controlling decisions by other courts of appeals. Cases applying this
principle include New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Iowa State Bank,02
Hennepin Co. v. M. W. Savage Factories, Inc.,9 3 Danner v. United
States,19 4 United States v. Blosser'95 and a number of others.,", Dur-
ing the period immediately following 1918, there was only one case
in which the court of appeals refused to follow an earlier decision of
another coequal court. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood 97 in 1938
the court recognized a decision that had been handed down by another
circuit, yet proceeded to reach its own conclusion. The court explained,
We are fully conscious of the fine ability of the Judges who
wrote and concurred in the opinions urged by appellant; and we
are sensitive to the desirability of harmony in the decisions of the
various Circuits. However, we are not permitted thus to relieve
ourselves of the duty of examining and determining for ourselves
the issues coming before us. Where we have serious doubt or the
determination is close, we are inclined to give solid weight to the
consideration of harmony in decision.'98
The court proceeded to make its own examination of the question and
reach its own conclusion.
Goodenow v. Commissioner'99 is a more recent example of the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applying the controlling deci-
sion doctrine. The fact that another circuit court had spoken on the
191. See text accompanying notes 186-88 supra.
192. 277 F. 713 (8th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 624 (1922).
193. 83 F.2d 453 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 555 (1936).
194. 100 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1938).
195. 104 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1939).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Eddy Bros., 291 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1961) (tax);
Estate of Spicknall v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1961) (tax); Mitchell v.
Hygrade Water & Soda Co., 285 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1960) (labor); In re Eatherton,
271 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1959) (bankruptcy); Commissioner v. Moran, 236 F.2d 595 (8th
Cir. 1959) (tax); Prewett v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1955) (tax); Bir-
mingham v. Geer, 185 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 951 (1951) (tax);
Martyn v. United States, 176 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1949) (criminal); United States v.
Armature Rewinding Co., 124 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1942) (tax); United States v. Kelley,
110 F.2d 922 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 669 (1940) (insurance); Grain Belt Sup-
ply Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 490 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 648 (1940)(tax).
197. 98 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1938), ajf'd, 307 U.S. 247 (1939).
198. Id. at 163.
199. 238 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1956).
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matter, regardless of the parties involved in the earlier adjudication,
seemed crucial. Goodenow involved an attempt by one party, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to relitigate a matter on which he
had lost in another circuit. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
fused to allow this, stating,
This Court has repeatedly ruled, particularly in tax cases,
where uniformity of decision among the Circuits is vitally im-
portant, that the decision of a Court of Appeals of another Circuit
should be followed unless demonstrably erroneous or unsound.
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ih
the Uptegrove Lumber Co. case we regard as sound and logical.
There is, we think, no reason why it should be rejected by this
Court.
The decision of the Tax Court is reversed upon the ground
that the assessment of the deficiency was barred by limitations.200
The attitude of the Eighth Circuit toward a prior adjudication re-
curs in Consentino v. Local 28, Masters,20 1 decided in 1959. In follow-
ig an earlier decision of the Seventh Circuit, the court stated,
In the interest of uniformity, a court of appeals is not justified
in refusing to follow the decision of another court of appeals unless
satisfied that the prior decision is clearly erroneous ...
Since the identical order which was the keystone for Judge
Harper's action was fully considered by the Seventh Circuit, that
Court's interpretation thereof is entitled to great weight, and we
should not adopt a contrary view unless it convincingly appears that
the decision. . . is palpably wrong.202
Having made no such finding, the court followed the earlier decision.
In 1960 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit faced the
question of the effect of improperly, admitted evidence of a witness'
veracity in a criminal case. 03 The Fifth Circuit had previously con-
sidered the effect and refused to reverse, relying on the particular
factual situation.20 4  The Eighth Circuit concurred, "As in the [Fifth
circuit case] we therefore feel constrained to hold, in the interest of
criminal administration, that it is not something which under the cir-
200. Id. at 22 (citations omitted).
201. 268 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1959).
202. Id. at 652.
203. Homan v. United States, 279 F.2d 767 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 866
(1960).
204. Kauz v. United States, 188 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1951).
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cumstances entitled appellant to a reversal. '2 5 The Court supported
its conclusion, stating,
We have in a long line of opinions declared that, on unsettled
questions of federal law, while a decision by another Court of Ap-
peals is not compulsively binding upon us, we will, in the interest
of judicial uniformity, accept it as persuasive and follow it, unless
we are clearly convinced that it is wrong.20
0
The court also cited twelve Eighth Circuit decisions in support of this
position.2 07
This same attitude was reflected by the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Delk Investment Corp. v. United States,208 another
tax case in which the court followed the Second Circuit on the point
of law involved, stating,
The policy of this court with, regard to uniformity in tax holdings
has been stated by us in C.I.R. v. Moran, 8 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d
595, 596: "* * * This court has repeatedly held, particularly in
tax matters, that the decision of another Court of Appeals should
be followed unless demonstrably erroneous or there appear cogent
reasons for its rejection." 200
The court thereupon rendered a judgment conforming to the position
taken by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit in 1974 was faced with earlier judgments'in
two circuits on a particular point of tax law.2 0  The court of appeals
acknowledged that "[n]one of the decisions is binding precedent in
this court, and several of the opinions are quite brief in their discussion
of the issue."211 Yet the court considered the matter and rejected the
government's argument, stating, "we cannot dismiss lightly the cumula-
tive weight of our fellow judges' decisions or the divisiveness and ad-
ministrative confusion that a contrary conclusion at this point might
foster. '212
Most recently the court, in North American Life & Casualty Co.
v. Commissioner,213 again articulated the principle of the controlling
205. Homan v. United States, 279 F.2d at 773.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 344 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
209. Id. at 697.
210. Foster Lumber Co. v. United States, 500 F.2d 1230, 1232 (8th Cir. 1974),
rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 204 (1976).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1233.
213. 533 F.2d 1046 (8th Cir. 1976).
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decision and emphasized its application in tax matters. The court as-
serted,
This court has long taken the position that uniformity of decision
among the circuits is vitally important on issues concerning the ad-
ministration of the tax laws. . . . Thus, decisions of other courts
of appeals in the area of taxation .should be followed unless they
are demonstrably erroneous or there appear cogent reasons for re-
jecting them. . . . Thus, as there appear no cogent reasons for
not following them and no other courts of appeals have rendered
contrary decisions, we follow them to the extent they are dispositive
of the issue before us. 214
In not all of the cases, however, has the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit followed earlier decisions by other courts of appeals.
Clark v. Board of Education21 5 was a case in which there seemingly
was an earlier controlling decision. After examining the case the court
decided that it was distinguishable from the earlier decision by the Fifth
Circuit. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated,
The breadth and depth of the segregation problem varies in
different states and in different parts of the same state. Therefore,
we can have no quarrel with the Fifth Circuit's 2-to-1 decision in
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education. If the ma-
jority of the Judges, in Jefferson County, believe the H.E.W.
Guidelines are the minimum necessary to meet the constitutional
mandate of a "unitary, non-racial system" in their Circuit, we feel
that is a matter for their sole consideration. As problems vary in
different parts of the country, of necessity the courts' orders to ef-
fectuate a common goal will also be varied. The Fifth Circuit has
borne the brunt of the school desegregation cases and its judgment
merits our respect and admiration for their devotion to this admit-
tedly difficult task. However, our factual situation is not the same
as theirs. Jefferson County is still dealing with dual attendance
zones. We are not. A much greater degree of integration has
been achieved in Arkansas than in the States directly concerned
in the Jefferson County decision. We don't think we should flatly
condemn a freedom of choice plan, as proposed by the Board,
which does give an annual freedom of choice to laterally transfer
schools to each student [sic], subject only to conditions of over-
crowding. We feel the plan should be given an opportunity to
work.21
6
Jaben v. United States217 is another case in which the Eighth Circuit
214. Id. at 1051.
215. 374 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1967).
216. Id. at 571.
217. 333 F.2d 535 (8th Cir.), affd, 381 U.S. 214 (1964).
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was faced with an earlier Ninth Circuit decision and refused to follow
it. The court stated, "[T]hat holding is not binding upon us, and with
all due deference, we are not inclined-for what we regard to be im-
pelling and cogent reasons-to follow that case. '218  The court then
examined a Supreme Court decision, a court of appeals decision and
two district court decisions, and concluded that the law was contrary
to the decision of the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit obviously found itself in a very difficult position since
earlier decisions of the federal courts were in disagreement; the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was forced to choose one line rather
than another.
i. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit approved the controlling decision doctrine in
1928 when it followed the decision of the Eighth Circuit disallowing
a deduction for obsolescence of goodwill of a wine business because
of the passage of prohibition.219
In NLRB v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc.220 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit was faced with the construction of the "agricultural
laborer" exception to the National Labor Relations Act. Three years
earlier the Fifth Circuit had faced a case with "substantially identical
facts." The Ninth Circuit decided to follow the earlier decision, noting
that the federal agency "admits that the facts in [the earlier case] are
'essentially the same' as those here, but urges that the case does not
correctly implement congressional intent." The court suggested, first,
that if Congress did not like the result in the earlier case it was free
to change the law and, secondly, that the federal agency "has not demon-
strated that we need create a conflict between the Circuits on this
point."22 '
Recently in litigation involving the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it was
not bound by an earlier decision rendered by the Third Circuit. 22 The
Ninth Circuit explained,
We recognize that our views both with regard to the interpre-
tation of the Clean Air Act and the constitutional issues here
218. Id. at 538.
219. Landsberger v. McLaughlin, 26 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1928); see text accompany.
ing notes 120-29 supra.
220. "471 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1972).
221. Id. at 21.
222. Brown v. Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975).
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discussed differ from those expressed in Pennsylvania v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974). With
regard to the latter issues, we believe with all deference that the
Third Circuit failed to recognize the difference between a state en-
gaging in commerce. . and a state's regulation of the commerce
of others. 223
y. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit, which is the newest, having been created out
of the Eighth Circuit in 1929,224 apparently has not firmly established
a policy on the question of the controlling decision of another circuit.
In 1953, however, in Grimland v. United States,22 5 which was a bank-
ruptcy case, the court of appeals indicated that though the court was
not bound by earlier decisions of other circuits, those decisions were
"persuasive and entitled to great weight, particularly in tax matters,
212 6
and the court did in fact follow the earlier decisions of the Ninth and
Sixth Circuits. 22
7
k. District of Columbia Circuit
No reference to the doctrine of controlling decisions is found in
the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit during the first half of the twentieth century. In 1958 the court
faced a patent problem regarding which there was a controlling deci-
sion by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.228  The court of ap-
peals acknowledged that the court making the first decision had the
approximate standing of another court of appeals with special compe-
tence to deal with technical issues. The court of appeals, however,
refused to follow the earlier decision stating that it was "persuasive and
entitled to deference" but not "authoritatively binding.
'229
A few years later the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals had before it litigation involving an insurance policy and requiring
construction of Missouri law.230  The court, faced with the question of
223. Id. at 838 n.45.
224. J. MooRE, JUDicIAL CoDE: COMMENTARY 0.03(51), at 455 (1949).
225. 206 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1953).
226. Id. at 601.
227. Kentucky ex rel. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Farmers Bank & Trust Co.,
139 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1943); In re Knox-Powell-Stockton Co., 100 F.2d 979 (9th Cir.
1939).
228. Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
229. Id. at 347.
230. Waters v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 363 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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following the other circuit's controlling decisions, stated,
Although the views of the Eighth Circuit, reflecting as they do
an experience more closely connected than ours with Missouri law,
are entitled to great weight, the law of Missouri can only be finally
and authoritatively gathered from the decisions of the courts of Mis-
souri. Since the Missouri cases indicate to us a result different
from that reached by the Eighth Circuit, we adhere to our reading
of those cases. 281
Again the court refused to follow the earlier decision.
The next year the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit faced a problem to which an answer had been given by thp
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals at an earlier time.282 The dis-
trict court from which the appeal was taken had not followed the earlier
decision. This time the court of appeals did follow the controlling de-
cision, stating, "We are of course not bound to do more than accord
to the holding of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals the degree
of deference due a coordinate court but we feel the holding of that
court presents the better alternative [to the district court's decision]."288
Subsequently the court was faced with litigation concerning an in-
surance policy when there were two controlling cases from another cir-
cuit, this time the Fifth.284 The court refused to follow the earlier deci-
sions with the following comment: "Decisions of district courts and
other courts of appeal are, of course, not binding on us and are looked
to only for their persuasive effect. If they fail to persuade by the use
of sound and logical reasoning, they will not be followed, no matter
how great their number. '285
In United States v. Washington Post Co.,286 an assertion was made
that an order, entered by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 2 " on
the day before an order of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals, was controlling. The court examined the situation of the liti-
gation and chose to proceed in its own way.288
231. Id. at 689.
232. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Brenner, 375 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
233. Id. at 601.
234. City Stores Co. v. Lemer Shops, Inc., 410 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.'1969).
235. Id. at 1014.
236. United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), alf'd per curiam, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
237. Id. at 1331; see United States v. New York Times, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.)
(per curiam) (en bane), rev'd per curiam, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
238. United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d at 1331-32.
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5. Different Panels of Same Court of Appeals
The problem of the effect to be given to an earlier decision is
found within a single court of appeals as well as between different
courts of appeals. One panel of a court may decide a question, and
the same question may come before a different panel of that same court
at a later time. The second panel must then decide whether it is bound
by the decision of the first panel or whether it has the right or duty
to decide the matter unrestricted by the first decision and thereby pos-
sibly create a conflict within the circuit.28 If a conflict is created, the
matter may have to be heard en banc. 2 40  A number of courts of ap-
peals apparently have reached the conclusion that one panel of a court
of appeals is required to follow the earlier ruling of a different panel
of that same court. The Third Circuit, for example, has stated,
[I]t has long been the rule in this Circuit that decisions made in
similar cases by panels of this Court are binding on other panels
but are not controlling on the Court En Banc. Indeed it is only
through the Court En Banc that precedents established by earlier
panel decisions may be reexamined. 24'
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has repeated its accept-
ance of this principle in several cases, 242 and recently Judge Roney of
that circuit referred to precedent "which this panel is bound to follow
under our policy of not overruling prior decisions except en banc. ''248
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has also adopted this posi-
tion.2 44 Thus court of appeals judges have accepted the idea that they
are restricted in their power to decide cases; they accept the view that
they must operate within the framework of prior cases decided in the
circuit.* Only in an en banc rehearing can freedom of decision unre-
strained by prior case law in the circuit be obtained.
239. Shattuck v. Hoegl, 523 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1975); Garfinkle v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 483 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1975).
240. FED. R. ApP. P. 35; 9 Moonn's FEDERAL PRAcrCE 1 235.02, at 4102 (2d ed.
1975).
241. In re Central R.R., 485 F.2d 208, 210-11 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1131 (1974).
242. See Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hawes,
529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); Burroughs v. United States, 515 F.2d 824 (5th Cir.
1975); Popeko v. United States, 513. F.2d 771 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 917
(1975).
243. McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 870, 883 (5th Cir. 1976)
(dissenting opinion).
244. Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Center, 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975). Here,
the court stated that a decision by the court itself "is binding, not only upon the district
court, but also upon another panel of this court-unless and until it is reconsidered en
banc." Id. at 642.
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The similarities are obvious between this situation and that where
one court of appeals has ruled on a matter and another court of appeals
is faced with the problem. In both situations a panel of judges must
decide what effect will be given to an earlier decision-by judges of co-
ordinate jurisdiction. Within the circuits a body of authority is develop-
ing a principle that one panel must follow a decision by another panel
within that circuit. One might logically ask why this principle does not
carry over to the situation where the earlier decision was by another
court of appeals.
6. Summary of the Law in the Circuits
As indicated by the preceding discussion, the doctrine of the con-
trolling decision has been a factor of some significance in the deciding
of cases by the various courts of appeals. 24 15  When one circuit reaches
a result different from that obtaining in an earlier decision in another
circuit it does not necessarily mean the second court has rejected the
position of the court first in time. Because of the lag in dissemination
of opinions or because of the nature of research done, it may well be
that the earlier decision was not called to the attention of the later
court. However, to obtain a complete picture, notice must be taken
of the numerous conflicts that have developed among the various courts
of appeals apparently without any thought being given by the second
court to the possibility that the earlier decision might be controlling on
subsequent litigation at the court of appeals level. 246
245. The Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are courts
of the same level as the various courts of appeals. The appellate provisions for the three
courts are approximately the same; judges can be moved from one of these courts to
another. 28 U.S.C. §§ 175, 291, 293 (1970).
In recent years the problem of deferring to an earlier decision by a coordinate court
has arisen in cases before these courts. In two cases the Court of Claims in tax litiga-
tion elected to follow the earlier decisions by courts of appeals. In Bryan v. United
States, 319 F.2d 880, 882 (Ct. Cl. 1963), the court referred to stare decisis, indicated
that the court of appeals had answered all the arguments put forth in that earlier case
and stated, "there is nothing in either proceeding which causes us to view the Circuit
Court's decision as unjust or undesirable." In Ben Constr. Corp. v. United States, 312
F.2d 781, 782 (Ct. Cl. 1963), which also involved elements of preclusion and stare de-
cisis, the court stated, "When two suits involve similar facts and issues, and the Court
rendering the first judgment has fully considered all the evidence and given its decision
thereon, the Court in the second case is free to follow that prior judgment upon the prin-
ciple of stare decisis, provided such consistency is just and desirable." But see In re
Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960), in which the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals stated that "[w]hile [a decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit] is entitled to deference, it is not authoritatively binding on us." Id. at 186.
246. See cases cited notes 248-56 infra. For examples of cases in which courts of
appeals have deliberately chosen not to follow an earlier decision by another court of
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This does not necessarily indicate a deliberate rejection of the doc-
trine of the controlling decision, but it does possibly represent a rejec-
tion of the ideas implicit in that doctrine. More than this, tae willing-
ness to decide each case unaffected by prior courts of appeals decisions
represents (1) an unwillingness to seek conformity, (2) an. apparent
rejection of the unity of the federal courts, and (3) a willingness to
have the law applied in different ways in different areas.
7. After Inconsistent Decisions Rendered
After a court of appeals (1) has unknowingly not followed an
earlier court of appeals decision or (2) has faced a supposedly control-
ling earlier decision by another appellate court and has refused to fol-
low that decision, there arises the problem of a third appellate court
facing the problem of the inconsistent earlier decisions. What should
the court faced with this situation do? It is difficult to assert which
decision should be controlling: the first in time? the most recent deci-
sion on the point? Unfortunately a number of these situations have
arisen in recent years.247
Because of the current indexing methods being used, it is impos-
sible to determine how frequently conflicts between circuits have
arisen. Without a doubt, there are numerous points of law on which
the circuits have differed and many of these have involved governmen-
tal agencies. As soon as a difference occurs courts entertaining subse-
quent litigation on the issue. are faced with the problem of conflicting
precedents. Although not exhaustive, the following examples show
that the problem does exist.
In litigation preceding the Bosch case,248 the Fourth Circuit was
faced with conflicting lines of authority in Pierpoint v. Commis-
sioner.249  In litigation dealing with the effect to be given in tax matters
appeals, see Shattuck v. Hoegl, 523 F.2d 509, 514-16 (2d Cir. 1975); Zacks v. United
States, 280 F.2d 829, 832 (Ct. Cl. 1960), rev'd, 375 U.S. 59 (1963). One district court,
in United States v. RJ. Reynolds Co., 416 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1976), has gone as
far as to say that only the Supreme Court of the United States can "speak with authority
to assure uniformity of federal law among the several circuits and districts." Id. at
320. In regard to this principle the court noted in footnote I to the opinion:
It is a matter of some amusement to note that this widely recognized
principle is one for which it is difficult to find explicit precedent above the
district court level. Yet it must be hornbook law because the existence of
a conflict between the decisions of the courts of appeals in two or more cir-
cuits provides a major basis for the grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court.
247. See cases cited notes 248-56 infra.
248. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
249. 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1964).
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to a state court adjudication concerning the property rights of individ-
uals, the court a~knowledged the different approaches and stated,
While the Third Circuit read Freuler somewhat differently and ap-
parently requires improper conduct to render proceedings in a nisi
prius court collusive, Gallagher v. Smith... , we feel our decision
is in line with the better reasoned cases of other circuits. See, e.g.
-the recent cases of Estate of Peyton . . . and Estate of Faulker-
son. .... 250
In Jones v. United States251 the Sixth Circuit was faced with a problem
that it had faced and decided at an earlier time, a question involving
anticipatory assignment of income. Since that earlier decision two
other circuits had decided the point contrary to the Sixth Circuit. The
latter court decided it should follow the other two circuits and reject
its own earlier decision.25 2  The dissenting judge felt that the district
court judge had properly applied the law of the circuit and that it should
be affirmed, rather than reversed because of the decisions of the other
circuits.
The problem has arisen with regard to various areas of the law.
The IRS has been involved in conflicting circuit decisions in litigation
concerning scholarships, fellowships and their taxation. 25  In the crim-
inal field, a significant split in the circuits is found in determining
whether an individual is "fleeing from justice." Some circuits hold'that
mere absence is sufficient;254 others hold that there must be an intent
to avoid punishment.25 5  In the field of environmental law there are
a number of significant conflicts among the various circuits in litiga-
tion involving the EPA.25 6
This development, when two courts of appeals have faced the
same problem with indonsistent decisions resulting and the matter is
250. Id. at 281.
251. 531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir. 1976).
252. Id. The court stated, "Upon consideration, we are persuaded to adopt the rule
expressed by the Second and Eighth Circuits. .. ." Id. at 1345.
253. See Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 394 U.S. 741
(1969); Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966); Woddail v. Commis-
sioner, 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963).
254. King v. United States, 144 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 854
(1944); McGowen v. United States, 105 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
552 (1939).
255. Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 486 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1973); Donnell v. United States,
229 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1956); Brouse v. United States, 68 F.2d 294 (1st Cir. 1933);
Porter v. United States, 91 F. 494 (5th Cir. 1898).
256. See, e.g., Ecology Center v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1975); Conserva-
tion Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974).
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then faced by another court of appeals, needs to be examined with
great care. There are several very undesirable aspects of this situation.
First, a great deal of time and societal resources are used-in deciding
the matter. Second, the resolution of the problem is questionable since
apparently different law is to be applied in different circuits. Third,
and flowing from the second, unfairness to individuals results from this
inconsistency.
One of the difficulties that arises when different rules exist in dif-
ferent circuits is that litigants will engage in "forum shopping." This
means that some litigants will be able to take advantage of different
rules in the various circuits. This perverts the judicial system and seri-
ously undercuts the respect of the general public in the system. The
federal government's policy of relitigation is, in part, a cause of this
problem because the government attempts to benefit from the conflicts
among the circuits by a policy of selective enforcement of the law.
D. Summary of Prior Decision as Controlling in Subsequent Litigation
Without doubt, conflicts have occurred among the various courts
of appeals on various points of law.257 There have been numerous oc-
casions when the courts simply have disagreed on fundamental legal
issues. This is not an unexpected development. In fact, Supreme
Court Rule 19 refers to the possibility of conflicts among circuits. How-
ever, conflict is not the only condition that has existed. For more than
a century various federal courts have deferred to an earlier decision
of a court of equal stature. During the period since the institution of
the circuit courts of appeals (now the courts of appeals), those courts
with some regularity have recognized the unity of the federal system
and have deferred in some measure to the decisions of coordinate
courts. In reaching this conclusion, the courts have given various rea-
sons.
A number of different justifications for the doctrine of control-
ling decision may be found. First, it might be argued that since they
are coordinate courts the second should not presume a superiority to
the first and that the normal doctrine of following precedent should
control. If the first has decided the problem, that should be sufficient
until a higher court changes the rule. Since we are talking about inter-
mediate appellate courts, it can be argued that the prior court's decision
257. See especially cases cited notes 248-56 supra.
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was the result of an initial trial consideration and then appellate review
and that this should assure thoughtful consideration.2 8
A second justification for recognizing a binding effect of the first
judgment can be found in the desirability of having the same law ap-
plied throughout the country. It is extremely unfair and illogical to
have, for example, different tax laws applied by the federal government
in different areas of the country. An unseemly conflict between courts
results if there is one view in one circuit and a different view in another.
This is not just theoretical; it is a very real problem. If the law were
applied uniformly litigants would not be tempted to play games with
the courts to seek particular results.
Finally, there is the use of the time of the courts in relitigating
matters that have been fully litigated and decided in an appellate court.
In terms of the total costs to society-time of judges, attorneys, litigants
-this may be an expense that should not be allowed.
An examination of the recent cases in the courts of appeals sug-
gests that the doctrine of controlling decision may not have the vitality
it once had. However, several observations seem to be in order. First,
the courts have apparently departed from the doctrine without any real
consideration of what they were doing or the negative effect that their
action might have. Second, the underlying principles that have been
the basis for the doctrine of controlling decision have lost none of their
vitality. Third, the growing confusion and conflict among the circuits
on questions of law is, in part at least, due to unwillingness to give any
effect to the decisions of other circuits. Fourth, the atrophy of the doc-
trine is due in some measure to a deliberate policy of relitigation on
the part of the federal agencies. Even so the doctrine of controlling de-
cision has not completely disappeared. Some of the courts of appeals
refer to the doctrine and apply it with.some frequency. 20
258. It must also be remembered that the court of appeals may hear the matter en
banc. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970).
259. The vitality of the doctrine of controlling decision is found in Federal Life Ins.
v. United States, 527 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), involving a suit for re-
fund of taxes allegedly overpaid. The court of appeals, finding for the taxpayer, noted
that a number of courts including one court of appeals had accepted the argument that
the taxpayer was making. The court stated,
Respect for the decisions of other circuits is especially important in tax cases
because of the importance of uniformity, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals of another circuit should be followed unless it is shown to be in-
correct, Goodenow v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1956). In this
case we believe the Fifth Circuit to have been demonstrably correct.
Id. at 1098-99. The panel deciding this case included Judge Stevens, who was a circuitjudge at the commencement of the appeal but who was Circuit Justice when the opinion
was handed down.
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]II. RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION
In the past three decades there has been an expansion and clarifi-
cation of the role of res judicata/preclusion in the courts of the country
in which the federal courts have played a significant part. As the Su-
preme Court noted in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University
of Illinois Foundation,260 there has been a rejection of the mutuality
requirement that allows for a greater use of preclusion, there has been
an expansion of the definition of "claim" in bar and merger-claim
preclusion--cases, and there has been a greater willingness to use pre-
clusion in criminal cases.261  There is every reason to believe that the
expansion of preclusion is not yet at an end. Several examples may
help to explain this.
A stranger to a law suit normally is not bound by the decision in
that suit. Interestingly enough, there are some recent decisions that
have suggested and even held ihat a stanger-not in a relationship of
privity with a losing party in the first suit-may be bound by the judg-
ment rendered in that suit.26 2 This seemingly turns on the relationship
that exists, even in an informal sense, between the losing party in the
first suit and the party to be precluded in the second. 65
Another example of the expansion of preclusion is found in the
situation where a federal court has handed down a judgment and subse-
quent litigation is commenced in a state court by a person not a party
in the federal court action. If the state court litigation might result in
an undercutting of the federal court judgment, the federal court may
enjoin the state action. This would be the traditional way to handle
the attack on the federal judgment. It may be, however, that the win-
ning party in the federal litigation may elect to raise the federal court
judgment in the state court litigation against the person who was not
260. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). In considering what effect is to be given in a federal
court to an earlier federal court decision, it can be argued that federal principles should
control. A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION V-483 to -490 (1969). The decision
in the Blonder-Tongue case certainly indicated that the Supreme Court felt that it had
freedom to decide what rule of preclusion would be applied in that case. ]n a diversity
case it might be urged that a different result might obtain, but in In re Air Crash Disas-
ter, 350 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Humphreys
v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973), the court indicated that the law of federal judg-
ments will be that constructed by the federal courts. Of course, in litigation involving
federal agencies the law to be applied will generally be federal law although this might
not always be true.
261. 402 U.S. at 327.
262. See Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion: Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. Ruv. 357
(1974); Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HAv. L. Rnv. 1485 (1974).
263. See authorities cited note 262 supra.
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a party to the first proceeding. A state court might well decide that
the party attacking the federal court judgment is barred by that judg-
ment and that the state court proceeding must be terminated. This
represents a logical expansion of preclusion, one that is demanded by
the exigencies of thesituation."
4
A third example of the possible expansion of preclusion is found
in Turner v. American Bar Association.' 5 In this case the judgment
purportedly barred litigation of a broad range of claims by any person
who might attempt to make them in the future. The judge affirma-
tively set forth the preclusive effect of the judgment he was handing
down as a clear warning to anyone who might try to litigate these mat-
ters in the future.
Preclusion is based on a desire to provide an end to litigation. In
so doing the rights of individuals are firmly established, harassment of
individuals is prevented, the courts are used in a more efficient way
and the prestige of the court system is enhanced. 26  The concept of
preclusion includes two facets: claim preclusion, which deals with the
effect to be given to a judgment in subsequent litigation dealing with
the same claim, and issue preclusion, which deals with the attempt to
relitigate a fact issue faced and decided in an earlier suit.
The federal government's policy of seeking affirmatively to reliti-
gate questions of law decided adversely to the government involves is-
sue preclusion. There may be some question about applying issue pre-
clusion to a government agency in such a situation because questions
of both fact and law are involved; it is not a matter of fact alone. The
present trend seems to be toward applying issue preclusion also to ques-
tions of law.267 The ALI Restatement of Judgments 2d, Tentative Draft
No. 1, provides in section 68, "When an issue of fact or law is actually
litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the deter-
mination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive
in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or
a different claim." This draft apparently has moved away from the
264. See Vestal, Protecting a Federal Court Judgment, 42 TENN. L. REv. 635, 650
(1975).
265. 407 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Tex., W.D. Pa., N.D. Ind., D. Minn., S.D. Ala., W.D
Wis. 1975), also discussed in text accompanying notes 275-77 infra.
266. A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION V-7 (1969).
267. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment c, at 162-63 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1973).
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differentiation between law and fact found in the original Restatement
of Judgments.268
On the question whether a determination of a question of law can
be issue preclusion, Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Corp.,269 in which the
Supreme Court expressed a willingness to apply the doctrine to issues
of law, is instructive. The Court stated, "This was res judicata of that
fact, if it be considered a fact, and nonetheless res judicata if it is a
decision on the law, binding in another cause of action arising from the
same controversy or claim. '27 1
Commissioner v. Sunnen27 1 includes a discussion of the applica-
tion of issue preclusion/collateral estoppel in tax litigation. The Court
expressed the view that issue preclusion of a legal issue might give one
taxpayer an unfair advantage over others because of a difference in tax
treatment. The Court expressed a fear of "inequalities in the admin-
istration of the revenue laws, discriminatory distinctions in tax liability,
and a fertile basis of litigious confusion. ' 72  It might be argued that
applying preclusion would minimize the very things the Court feared.
Where there is now discrimination in taxes applied to various citizens
residing in different circuits, uniformity could be provided by preclud-
ing the government from relitigating adverse decision. Where there
is now litigious confusion because of relitigation by the government,
the application of preclusion against the government would cut down
on confusion and litigation.
Although there may be some confusion about the general rule, is-
sue preclusion normally arises if an issue necessary for the decision has
been litigated between the parties and if the party to be precluded had
the incentive and opportunity to litigate the issue. Since this is a de-
veloping area of the law, it would seem that the courts could adopt the
rule of decision they feel best serves the interests of the government,
the litigants, the courts and society generally. When the government
has litigated the matter at the court of appeals level it would seem logi-
cal to say that it has had the incentive and opportunity to litigate the
matter fully and that preclusion should apply. A strict application of
preclusion might demand that the government be precluded by a dis-
268. Compare RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942) with § 70 of that Restate-
ment.
269. 347 U.S. 89, 103 & n.9 (1954).
270. Id. at 103. But see Young v. Edwards, 389 Mich. 333, 207 N.W.2d 126
(1973); A. VFSTAL, RFs JuDIcATA/PRECLusioN V-250 (1969).
271. 333 U.S. 591, 597-602 (1948).
272. Id. at 599.
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trict court decision, but courts developing the law should consider all
of the applicable principles before deciding what rule should be ap-
plied. Holding for preclusion at the court of appeals level would seem
to be (1) consistent with the concept of preclusion, (2) supported by
the principles that undergird preclusion and (3) justified by the role
the government plays at that point.
IV. UNITARY NATURE OF THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM
In examining the policy of relitigation adopted by federal admin-
istrative agencies, it is necessary to look at the federal court system it-
self. The federal courts-district courts and courts of appeals-are not
a disparate group of individuals who operate quite apart from one an-
other. Rather the judges are integrated members of a closely-knit or-
ganization. The judges have offices together; they sit together; they
move readily from one court to another; district judges sit on courts
of appeals; court of appeals judges sit on the district courts. Judges
move readily from one circuit to another. The number of judges is
small enough and the relationships close enough that most judges are
acquainted with many others. They gather annually in circuit confer-
ences. At the national level they participate in conferences together.
For example, at an ALl meeting there is a possibility that a substantial
number of federal judges will be in attendance.
The unitary nature of the federal court system has been well de-
scribed by Judge Haynsworth in Atkins v. Schmutz Manufacturing
CoY.73 Commenting on the emphasis placed on "the functioning of the
system as a whole," he stated,
The great burden of judicial work of the system . is con-
ducted in the District Courts; courts of general jurisdiction encom-
passing almost the whole of federal jurisdiction itself. In each dis-
trict there is but one District Court, and the boundaries of many
districts coincide with those of whole states....
S. . [T]he Circuit Courts exercise substantial administrative
control over the District Courts within the Circuit and their judges,
and the Chief Circuit Judge may assign judges anywhere in the
Circuit if the work requires. With the consent of the Chief Justice
and the Chief Circuit Judges concerned, such assignments may be
made to other circuits.
In a developing sense, the boundaries of a district are not im-
penetrable walls strictly confining the power of a District Court..
273. 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970).
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Even if the district encompasses only a part of a state, the process
of the District Court reaches throughout the state. When addi-
tional parties need be brought in, its process may reach out a hun-
dred miles, across district and state boundaries. In interpleader ac-
tions, its process reaches throughout the nation.
Relatively liberal provisions for the transfer of cases from dis-
trict to district permit consolidations for trials and evidence a co-
operative functioning of the parts of the system. Recent develop-
ments in the handling of multi-district litigation arising out of such
things as airline crashes and multitudinous anti-trust claims now
permit the consolidation for pretrial processing of all such cases by
one judge in one district under the general supervision of a special
panel of judges. Duplications and wasteful effort and. expense are
thus avoided in a system capable of functioning in a unitary man-
ner.
A judgment obtained in one district court may be enforced in
another, without formal proof of judgment, by filing a certified
copy of the judgment in the district in which enforcement is sought.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1963.
The capacity of the federal courts to function cooperatively
led Judge Parker, speaking for this court, to describe the system
as "unified" and to approve the transfer of an action, timely filed
in the Southern District of New York in the Second Circuit, but
where the respondent ship had not been found, to the District -of
Maryland, where the ship could be attached, though the statute of
limitations had run before the transfer. In somewhat similar cir-
cumstances, the Supreme Court approved the transfer of a case
from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where it had been filed
but where the defendants could not be "found," to the Southern
District of New York where the defendants could be "found."
That transfer was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), one of
several procedural provisions affording federal court litigants pro-
tection against "justice-defeating technicalities. '274
The essential unity of the federal* system was shown recently in
a case discussed earlier, Turner v. American Bar Association.27 5  A
number of individuals, claiming a right to have unlicensed persons prac-
tice law in the federal courts, commenced actions in various federal
courts against the American Bar Association and members of the fed-
eral judiciary. The Chief Justice, in order to handle this series of cases
in the most expeditious manner, assigned all of the cases to a single
federal court judge sitting in the Federal District Court for the North-
274. Id. at 533-34.
275. 407 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Tex., W.D. Pa., N.D. Ind., D. Minn., S.D. Ala., W.D.
Wis. 1975).
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ern District of Texas. This meant that when the district judge held
court he was holding court in the Northern District of Texas, the West-
ern District of Pennsylvania, the Northern District of Indiana, the Dis-
trict of Minnesota, the Southern District of Alibama and the Western
District of Wisconsin. 7 6  This one judge was holding court in six dif-
fer6nt federal courts in four different circuits. This action of assigning
these cases to one judge shows the essential unity of the federal sys-
tem.277
The interchangeable nature of the courts of appeals is shown in
the cases that allow the transfer of cases from one court of appeals to
another. As one court of appeals stated with regard to its ability to
transfer a proceeding, "[W]e have the inherent power to order it in
the interest of justice and sound judicial administration. While we ap-
parently have not so ruled recently . . . the great weight of authority
now is that such inherent power exists. ' 2 78
Implicit in the transferring of cases between circuits are (1) the
idea that the law in various circuits is the same, and (2) the idea that
the law applicable in the United States courts should be the same. One
court faced with a request for a transfer considered the possible bene-
fits accruing from such an action. It stated,
We must also consider that litigation in several circuits, with pos-
sible inconsistent and delayed results on the merits, can only serve
to frustrate the strong Congressional interest in improving the envi-
ronment as evidenced by the Clean Air Act. Additionally, we do
not feel that judicial manpower is so abundant as to permit several
circuits to solve identical complex legal and factual issues in the
present case.279
276. In May, 1974, and thereafter, the Chief Justice of the United States Su-
preme Court, Warren E. Burger, and the Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit, John
R. Brown, began designating the undersigned [D.J. Garza] to sit in seven sim-ilar cases and three related cases filed in the United States District Courts in
the States of Texas, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Minnesota, Alabama and Wiscon-
sin.
Id. at 456.
277. This is not the only occasion on which a federal court has sat in more than
one district. In United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev.,
E.D. Wash. 1962), the judge was sitting in two different district courts. In this case
the two district courts were in the same circuit so that there was no problem about the
appeal. The decision was affirmed in part and modified in part, sub nom. United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
278. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 519 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1975). See
also Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 337 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1964).
279. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 492, 495 (Ist Cir.
1972).
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These same considerations should militate in favor of the application
of issue preclusion against government agencies. Using issue preclu-
sion against the government would eliminate inconsistent results and
would cut down on the use of judicial manpower in relitigation of issues
already decided against the government. The transfer of cases from
one circuit to another is apparently premised on a desire for uniformity
of decision; the acceptance of such transfer becomes an argument for
uniformity through issue preclusion against government agencies. 280
The concept of a unified system, as opposed to free-standing
courts, is found also in the vertical relationship of the federal courts.
When a federal court faces a question of state law that is dispogitive
of the action, the district court judge will decide the matter.281 Once
a district court judge decides the matter, there is a possibility that an
appeal will be taken to the circuit court of appeals. Among many of
the circuits there is a feeling that some weight should be given to the
district court determination of the matter of state law. The degrees
of weight accorded are articulated as "deferring" to the district court
determination, 282 not reversing if the district court conclusion is permis-
sible, 283.giving great weight to the district court determination28 4 or re-
.versing only if the district court misconceived or misapplied the state
law.288 In its various articulations, this general principle has bebn ap-
plied by all of the courts of appeals west of the Mississippi River.
28 6
Vertical unity is also found in the fact that district court judges sit with
some frequency on the courts of appeals and review decisions rendered
by other district court judges of the circuit.28 7
The fact that the federal system is, in truth, a unitary one should
have some effect upon the operation of that system. The judges, func-
280. The concept of uniformity of decision in the federal courts also undergirds
transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1970) from one proper venue to another proper
venue.
281. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
282. E.g., Manning v. Jones, 349 F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1965).
283. E.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. Wire Rope Corp., 367 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1966).
284. E.g., Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Johnson, 453 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
285. E.g., Harris v. Hercules, Inc., 455 F.2d 267 (8th Cir. 1972).
286. In its various articulations, it has been applied in the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits. See Douglas v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 469 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1972); Wy-
oming Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 990 (10th
Cir. 1972); Harris v. Hercules, Inc., 455 F.2d 267 (8th Cir. 1972); C.H. Leavell & Co.
v. Board of Comm'rs, 424 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1970); Ford v. International Harvester
Co., 399 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1968); Insurance Co. of North America v. English, 395
F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1968); Manning v. Jones, 349 F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1965); Pendergraft
v. Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co., 342 F.2d 427 (10th Cir. 1965).
287. 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (1970).
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tigning in this close-knit relationship, are in a position to operate so
that the output of the system is a consistent whole. At least the con-
flicts and inconsistencies should be kept to a minimum. The approach
of the participants in the judicial system should reasonably be expected
to be one of cooperation and understanding rather than conflict and
confusion.
V. SYNTHESIS; CONCLUSION
The governmental policy of relitigation of issues decided against
the government must be examined in light of (1) the doctrine of con-
trolling decision that has developed over the years and that still has
some vitality at the present time,288 (2) res judicata/preclusion as it
has developed and expanded and (3) the unitary nature of the federal
system. More fundamentally, the doctrine of relitigation must be ex-
amined in the terms of its effect on the public and the possible adverse
consequences that may flow from such relitigation.
A factor underlying both the doctrine of controlling decisions and
res judicata/preclusion is the desire to afford equal treatment to all liti-
gants. If the same law is going to be applied to all litigants, some way
must be devised to establish the law definitively. This does not neces-
sarily mean that the law must be decided correctly but it does mean
that the law must be articulated with finality. As has been stated,
"This is really one of the silent, unconsidered, yet most valuable func-
tions of a Supreme Court. Not that it is infallible, but that it can au-
thoritatively settle disputed questions and make uniform a law that
might be differently and variously decided by the ablest and most up-
right men. .. "29
288. See discussion of various courts of appeals at notes 98-245 supra.
289. Lamar, A Unique and Unfamiliar Chapter in Our American Legal History, 10
A.B.A.J. 513, 516 (1924). Speaking to this same point Mr. Justice Brandeis- stated,
"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . This is com-
ronly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can
be had by legislation." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
While recognizing the need for some flexibility, Judge Cardozo said in reference
to the New York Court of Appeals:
We have had ten judges, of whom only seven sit at a time. It happens again
and, again, where the question is a close one, that a case which one week is
decided one way might be decided another way the next if it were then heard
for the first time. The situation would, however, be intolerable if the weekly
changes in the composition of the court were accompanied by changes in its
rulings. In such circumstances there is nothing to do except to stand by the
errors of our brethren of the week before, whether we relish them or not.
B. CA nozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in SELrc"n Warrm s 171 (1947).
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In the case of litigation concerning federal agencies, certainty and
uniformity are more to be desired than correctness in the interpreta-
tion of applicable statutes. When a situation exists in which circuits
conflict on interpretation there is a serious question about what result
is correct. It is undesirable to allow uncertainty and dissimilar treat-
ment to continue for any period of time. Justice Cardozo articulated
the reasons: "One of the most fundamental social interests is that law
shall be uniform and impartial. There must be nothing in its action
that savors of prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim or fitfulness.
Therefore in the main there shall be adherence to precedent. '290
Stability of decision to avoid burdening the courts with repetitive
litigation is another concept that undergirds both the doctrine of con-
trolling decisions and res judicata/preclusion. Speaking to the matter
of stability of decision, Justice Cardozo stated,
In these days, there is a good deal of discussion whether the
rule of adherence to precedent ought to be abandoned altogether.
I would not go so far myself. I think adherence to precedent
should be the rule and not the exception.... the labor of judges
would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past deci-
sion could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's
own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid
by others who had gone before him.291
If repeated litigation of the same matter is allowed, courts, attor-
neys and litigants will be involved in the expenditure of time and ef-
fort in a way that would seem to be grossly wasteful of the resources
of society. Also, terminating litigation at some point protects parties
from harassment and repetitive attacks on the same matter by a litigious
individual who is willing to spend his resources in endless litigation.29 2
A subordinate but somewhat significant factor is the prestige of the
courts, which suffers if there is repetitive litigation of a matter with in-
consistent results in various courts with the law being applied differ-
ently in different parts of the country.2 98
If the Supreme Court has a genuine "concern for efficient opera-
tion of the lower federal courts"294 it should consider taking steps to
minimize relitigation of issues in those courts, such as enforcing issue
290. B. CAnnozo, supra note 289, at 153.
291. Id. at 170-71 (footnotes omitted).
292. See, e.g., Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1964).
293. See A. VEsTAL, REs JuDIcATA/pREcLUSIoN V-12 (1969).
294. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 128 (1965).
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preclusion on matters of law against government agencies at least at
the court of appeals level.
A. Alternative Methods of Getting Uniformity
Should the courts adopt the idea that a court of appeals could
establish the law to be applied in the federal courts and so prevent reliti-
gation by the federal government, a giant step would be taken toward
uniformity in the law applied in the federal courts. This idea-uni-
formity of law applied-is an end that has been sought by numerous
people from time to time. The proposal for a National Court of Ap-
peals2 95 in part is justified by the uniformity in law applied that would
be achieved. Uniformity could also be obtained by centralizing all
cases of a certain type in a single court either by a jurisdictional provi-
sion or by a venue requirement. For example, the Regional Rail Reor-
ganization Act296 authorized a single special court to handle litigation
under that Act.21 7  The special court was constituted and ordered to
hear litigation pending in federal courts298 concerning bankruptcies of
a number of railroads. In this way uniformity was obtained in proceed-
ings required under sections 207(b) and 303 of the Act. This same
uniformity in result was obtained under the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942, which created the Emergency Court of Appeals. 20 0  This
court had exclusive jurisdiction "to determine the validity of regula-
tions, orders, and price schedules issued pursuant to the Price Control
Act."800 As the Supreme Court stated, "This was accomplished by the
exercise of the constitutional power of Congress to prescribe the juris-
diction of inferior federal courts, and the jurisdiction of all state courts
to determine federal questions, and to vest that jurisdiction in a single
court, the Emergency Court of Appeals." 0' Another example is 42
U.S.C. section 4915; which provides for review of EPA orders concern-
295. COMMISSION ON REVISION, supra note 26, at 39.
296. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-794 (Supp. V 1975).
297. 45 U.S.C. § 719(b) (Supp. V 1975).
298. See In re Litigation Under Regional Rail Reorg. Act of 1973, 373 F. Supp.
1401 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974) (per curiam).
299. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, tit. II, ch. 26, § 1, 56 Stat. 31 (previously codified at
50 U.S.C. app. § 924(c)). The Emergency Price Control Act expired in 1947. In
1970, Congress established the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals to handle ap-
peals from the district courts in caies arising under the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970. Act of Aug. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, § 211, 84 Stat. 799 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1904 (Supp. V 1975)).
300. 1 MOORE'S FnmtLAJ Pnc'Icn 0.3[9], at 57 (2d ed. 1976).
301. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 429 (1944).
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ing noise control only in the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit. The same section provides the same venue limitation
concerning FAA orders under 49 U.S.C. section 1431. By limiting re-
view there is assured a uniformity in decision.
B. Moving Toward Uniformity in-Federal Litigation
It would seem reasonable to apply issue preclusion on matters of
law against the government at the court of appeals level. Certainly
by the time the litigation reaches that level the government has had
the opportunity and incentive to litigate the matter fully. It must be
noted that the thesis being advanced here was argued to some extent
in Divine v. Commissioner,80 2 and rejected by the court. A reading
of the opinion will suggest that the arguments against the thesis are
not convincing. For example, the court states, ". . . having a number
of circuits consider the substantive tax issue is desirable inasmuch as
several consecutive adverse rulings may convince the Commissioner
that the issue should no longer be contested." 30 3 If the court had held
the Commissioner bound by an adverse ruling, it would not have been
necessary to convince the Commissioner; he would not have been able to
contest the matter; it would have been laid to rest immediately.
The court further stated,
In concluding our analysis, we think it important to mention that
our decision is consonant with the often articulated grounds justify-
ing the rule permitting collateral estoppel. The rule developed as
a means of protecting a person from legal harassment and re-
dundant legal fees. Divine [the taxpayer] will be subject to
neither.804
The court is too simplistic in this analysis of collateral estoppel/issue
preclusion. The government does, in fact, pick the party against whom
it wishes to litigate, the time at which the litigation is to occur and the
court in which the litigation will be heard. Even when the government
is sued, it can manipulate the litigation so as to avoid an adjudication
at the court of appeals level. Prior to the commencement of the action
the government may even concede the point to the potential litigant
to avoid the possibility of litigation on the matter with the particular
individual at that time.
302. 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974), rejecting the argument that an earlier decision,
Luckman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1969), should be preclusive.
303. Id. at 1050.
304. Id.
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It may be asked whether it is reasonable to demand that the gov-
eminent accept a court of appeals decision as conclusive on the point
and force the government to live with the decision. First, it must be
remembered that the decision is the conclusion ofa court of appeals,
thereby giving the decision some stature. Secondly, the federal gov-
ernment has the right to seek an en banc rehearing on the matter in
the court of appeals. Third, the court of appeals if concerned about
the correctness of its conclusion can certify the question to the United
States Supreme Court for an answer. 0 :
More importantly, however, if the government agency feels it can-
not live with the interpretation given by the court of appeals, it can
ask Congress to change the law, and agencies do seek and get legisla-
tion. It would seem reasonable to direct the agency's efforts to get
a change toward Congress rather than toward the courts. Relitigation
of a decided point in an attempt to get a different result means that
the government is attempting to apply the law differently to some per-
sons than it is being applied under the earlier decision to other persons
in the same situation. This seems on its face to be discriminatory and
undesirable. Some national uniformity in the application of the law
and the end to some repetitive, confusing. litigation will be achieved
if issue preclusion is applied against the government at the court of ap-
peals level.
Preclusion against the government probably should not include
decisions on matters of constitutional law. This exception would seem
to be logical since the federal agencies could not get a change in the
law from Congress. Perhaps, too, on a constitutional matter the bal-
ance may be in favor of allowing a number of courts of appeals to ad-
dress the matter to get a full ventilating of the conflicting considerations
before the Supreme Court finally decides the question.80
In deciding the effect of the judgment of one court on the pro-
ceedings in a second the judiciary has displayed some of its greatest
ingenuity. Enormous steps in this area have been taken in the interest
of justice.30 7 The Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
305. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1970).
306. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for himself in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio
Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950), noted, "It may be desirable to have different as-
pects of an issue further illumined by the lower courts. Wise adjudication has its own
time for ripening."
307. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964); United States
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962), af/'d sub nom.
United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 379
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Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, recognizing that res judicata/
preclusion was undergoing substantial changes, stated,
Undeniably, the court-produced doctrine of mutuality of
estoppel is undergoing fundamental change in the common-law tra-
dition. In its pristine formulation, an increasing number of courts
have rejected the principle as unsound. Nor is it irrelevant that
the abrogation of mutuality has been accompanied by other devel-
opments-such as expansion of the definition of "claim" in bar and
merger contexts and expansion of preclusive effects afforded crim-
inal judgments in civil litigation-which enhance the capabilities of
the courts to deal with some issues swiftly but fairly.308
The Court then spoke to the broad question, "whether it is any longer
tenable to afford a litigant more than one full and fair opportunity for
judicial resolution of the same issue."3 09 Other relevant considerations
in the eyes of the Court seemed to be the "gaming table" approach
to litigation and the possible misallocation of resources in repetitive liti-
gation. 10 These considerations are significant in evaluating relitiga-
tion of decided issues, and might be viewed as ample justification for
the change in the law that has been suggested.
This is a cry for the federal courts again to take a giant step in
the interests of all people in the United States. It is a move beyond
the present law, but it is consistent with the precedents of the past and
would show again the ability of the courts to face and solve significant
problems.
U.S. 951 (1964); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'1 Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
308. 402 U.S. 313, 327 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
309. Id. at 328.
310. Id. at 329.

